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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between institutional investor holdings and stock mis-
valuation in the U.S. between 1980 and 2010. I find that institutional investors overweigh
overvalued and underweigh undervalued stocks in their portfolio, taking the market port-
folio as a benchmark. Cross-sectionally, institutional investors hold more overvalued stocks
than undervalued stocks. The time-series studies also show that institutional ownership of
overvalued portfolios increases as the portfolios’ degree of overvaluation. As an investment
strategy, institutional investors’ ride of stock misvaluation is neither driven by the fund
flows from individual investors into institutions, nor industry-specific. Consistent with the
agency problem explanation, investment companies and independent investment advisors
have a higher tendency to ride stock misvaluation than other institutions. There is weak
evidence that institutional investors make a profit by riding stock misvaluation. My find-
ings challenge the models that view individual investors as noise traders and disregard the
role of institutional investors in stock market misvaluation.
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1. Introduction
Stock market investors are classified as two broad types: arbitrageurs and noise
traders.1 Noise traders trade for non-information-based reasons and are subject to sys-
tematic biases on their stock return expectations. In contrast, arbitrageurs form rational
expectations based on the available information and correct any stock misvaluation caused
by the trading of noise traders. The existence of noise traders subsidizes arbitrageurs’ in-
formation production cost (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). In reality, the participants in the
stock market are composed of institutional investors and individual retail investors. The
previous literature regarded sophisticated institutional investors as informed arbitrageurs
and behavioral individual investors as noise traders, which leads to a question. Why does
stock misvaluation still persist in a stock market which institutional investors dominate in
terms of both market share and trading volume? To better understand the role of insti-
tutions in stock market misvaluation, I investigate the institutional holdings of mispriced
stocks in the U.S. stock market.
Although the efficient market hypothesis precludes the existence of long-term stock
misvaluation, the presence of mispriced stocks has been widely documented. For individual
stocks, some famous examples are the mispricing of carve-outs when 3COM spun off its
Palm unit in March 2000; the dual-listed stock price discrepancies for Infosys on March
7, 2000; and the price gaps between Royal Dutch and Shell from 1907 to 2005. Other
examples of misvaluation on the stock market level are the Japanese stock market bubble
in the late 1980s’, the Dot-com bubble in the late 1990s’, and the real estate bubble in
2007. Indeed, there has been a long debate on the existence of stock bubbles in the previous
literature.2 But a common consensus that stock prices may deviate from their intrinsic
1Other common names for arbitrageurs are rational speculators and smart money. Noise traders are
also known as behavioral traders, liquidity traders, irrational investors, or dumb money.
2For example, Cochrane (2002) argues that internet stocks were in short of supply during the “Dot-
com bubble” boom because the lock-up period after the initial public offerings of technology companies
limited the shares of internet firm stocks traded in the stock market. The limited outstanding shares of
internet stocks provided a convenience yield for investors to hold the floating shares, which explains the
overvaluation of internet stocks.
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value, at least in the short-run, has been reached.
Why do rational arbitrageurs fail to drive stock prices back to their intrinsic value?
Among all the explanations for the failure of arbitrage, three are generally accepted by most
researchers. Firstly, both fundamental risk and noise trader risk cause an unpredictability
of future returns on mispriced stocks (Black, 1985; Mitchell et al., 2002; Lamont and Thaler,
2003). Secondly, stock misvaluation can only be corrected if arbitrageurs collectively trade
against it. But the synchronization among arbitrageurs is hard to achieve in practice
(Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002, 2003). Thirdly, heterogenous investor opinions and short
sale constraints limit the arbitrage, so that only good information is reflected in stock
prices (Miller, 1977; Diether et al., 2002; Jones and Lamont, 2002). However these theories
may not fully explain the persistence of stock misvaluation in the U.S. stock market.
In 1950, 90% of U.S. corporate equities were held by individual investors (Allen, 2001).
At that time, even if institutions3 traded against stock misvaluation, they might not have
sufficient capital to correct stock mispricing promptly. Gradually, the U.S. stock market has
become more institutionalized. According to Gompers and Metrick (2001), the largest one
hundred institutions controlled more than half of the market value of U.S. publicly traded
equities in 1996. Ferreira and Matos (2008) also report that the institutional stock holdings
accounted for 65.7% of the U.S. stock market value in 2005, 59.6% if held domestically.
The previous empirical literature shows that institutions are better informed and less likely
to be affected by irrationality than individual investors (Griffin et al., 2003; Barber et al.,
2009; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009). If institutions trade as arbitrageurs, they should be
able to correct the stock misvaluation caused by the trading of noise traders. Recent
empirical evidence also documents institutional herding, which raises some doubts about
the impossibility of the synchronization among institutions. Lastly, Battalio and Schultz
(2006) argue that during the Dot-com bubble period, investors were able to synthetically
short overpriced internet stocks using stock options but they chose not to do so. Short sale
3Throughout the paper, I use “institution” and “institutional investor” interchangeably.
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constraints may not prevent institutional investors from trading against stock misvaluation
because they are the major participants in the derivatives market.
Despite the growth of institutional holdings in the U.S. stock market, it is uncertain
whether institutional investors trade against stock misvaluation on average. In this paper,
three related research questions are studied. Firstly, I identify stock misvaluation using the
factor asset pricing model alpha along with two other supplementary methods. Secondly, I
investigate whether institutional investors trade against or ride stock misvaluation. Finally,
I study which type of institution has a higher tendency to ride stock misvaluation than the
others.
Using all the stocks in the U.S. stock market over 1980–2010, I identify stock misval-
uation using three methods. The first method to detect stock misvaluation is the rolling
regression based on a six-factor model that includes the Fama and French (1993) three
factors, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity
factor, and the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting against beta factor.4 The regressions
are estimated on a five-year window and rolled over my whole sample period. The factor
model alpha can be taken as the measure of misvaluation at the stock level. If stock mis-
valuation always gets corrected due to either exogenous or endogenous reasons, overvalued
(undervalued) stocks have negative (positive) abnormal returns in the long run. Therefore
stocks with significantly negative (positive) alphas are overvalued (undervalued) during
the five-year window.5
In the second method, I follow Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and assign stocks to
quintile or decile portfolios at the end of each month based on their valuation ratios: Price-
to-Sales ratio (P/S) or Price-to-Earnings ratio (P/E). Then I calculate equally-weighted
4The first five factors are commonly used in both empirical asset pricing and empirical corporate finance
literature. I thank the anonymous reviewer’s suggestion to include the betting against beta factor in our
alpha estimation.
5The Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model augmented by the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor model are checked
as well. I also replace five-year rolling windows by three-year rolling windows. My main findings are robust
to these specifications.
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(EW) and value-weighted (VW) monthly returns of these portfolios, and fit monthly port-
folio returns to the six-factor model. The portfolios composed of the highest (lowest)
valuation ratio stocks have significantly negative (positive) alphas, suggesting that they
are indeed overvalued (undervalued) on average. I also record portfolio five-year rolling
alphas, which can be taken as the time-series measurement for the degree of misvaluation.
In the third method, I sort all stocks into quintile portfolios at the end of each month
by a dispersion of opinion proxy in the previous month. Then I divide each quintile portfolio
further into five groups based on the rank of each stock’s short sale constraint proxy in
the previous month. Miller (1977) shows that stocks with high dispersion of opinions and
high short sale constraints are likely to be overvalued. Boehmer et al. (2006) also find
empirical evidence to support Miller’s theory. Consistent with these two studies, I find a
significantly negative (positive) six-factor model alpha for the portfolio with the highest
(lowest) dispersion of opinions and the highest (lowest) short sale constraints.
After identifying mispriced stocks and their degree of misvaluation, I investigate the
institutional holdings of these mispriced stocks. Following the previous literature, I define
institutional holding measures using the Thomson Reuters 13F database. Institutional
investors do not appear to underweigh (overweigh) overvalued (undervalued) stocks in their
portfolios, using the market portfolio as a benchmark. Intuitively, the negative valuation
ratio stocks are more overvalued than stocks with the highest positive valuation ratio. I
find that approximately half of the stocks in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004)’s overvalued
portfolio (top quintile P/S stocks) have negative P/E. And institutional investors do not
underweigh these negative P/E stocks in their portfolio comparing to the market portfolio.
Similar results are also found when I use the six-factor model alpha as the misvalu-
ation measure. The weights of stocks with significantly negative alphas on the aggregate
institutional portfolio are very close to their weights on the market portfolio over my whole
sample period, suggesting that institutional investors tend to ride stock misvaluation in-
stead of trading against it. Next I compare the institutional holdings of overvalued stocks
and undervalued stocks cross-sectionally. Using all the misvaluation measures, the time-
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series mean of the cross-sectional average of institutional ownership is higher for overvalued
stocks than for undervalued stocks. Overall, the tabulated statistics show that institu-
tions do not correct misvaluation since they hold more overvalued stocks than undervalued
stocks.
Using multivariate regressions, I show that institutional investors hold more negative
alpha stocks than positive alpha stocks, controlling for other stock characteristics. Addi-
tionally, there is a different tendency to invest in overvalued stocks across institution types.
I find that investment companies and independent investment advisors have a higher ten-
dency to hold overvalued stocks than other institutions do. Time-series tests further show
that institutions increase their holdings of the overvalued stocks when the overvaluation
continues to grow. The time-series relationship between the institutional holdings of over-
priced portfolios and the overpriced portfolios’ rolling alphas is negative, indicating that
institutional investors ride stock misvaluation instead of trading against it.
Besides my main results, I find that institutional investor riding stock misvaluation
can not be explained by the inflow of funds from individual investors. Institutions do not
have a higher tendency to invest in overvalued stocks during the quarters when fund inflows
into institutions are higher. And my results are not driven by the Dot-com bubble period
and the real estate bubble period either. I find qualitatively similar results for the sample
period 1980-1994. Nor are my results industry-specific. I find that institutions overinvest
on overvalued stocks in 31 out of the 49 Fama–French industries. The rest of the 18
industries are mainly traditional industries such as Mining and Defense. Institutions show
no significant preference for overvalued and undervalued stocks for all of them. Finally, I
find weak evidence that institutional investors make a profit by riding stock misvaluation.
In summary, this paper challenges the previous theories that view individual investors
as noise traders and institutional investors as rational arbitrageurs. We cannot disregard
the role of institutional trading in stock misvaluation and use individual investor’s irra-
tionality as the only explanation for stock misvaluation. Kelley and Tetlock (2013) find
evidence that the aggregate individual investor is “wise” and that net retail buying can
6
predict future stock returns in their sample from February 2006 to December 2007. Riding
stock misvaluation does not mean that institutional investors lose money. On the contrary,
institutional investors may gain more profits when they correctly reflect the pulse of stock
misvaluation and exit before the price correction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the re-
lated literature. Section 3 develops the hypothesis. Section 4 describes the data sample and
variable definitions. Section 5 investigates stock misvaluation and forms overvalued (un-
dervalued) stock portfolios. I also show here whether institutional investors correct stock
misvaluation or ride stock misvalation wave. Section 6 includes the results of robustness
tests, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Institutions have gradually dominated the U.S. stock market in terms of both market
share ownership and trading volume (e.g., Allen, 2001; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Griffin
et al., 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Kaniel et al., 2008). Because institutional investors
and individual investors differ in their demand for stock characteristics and their trading
strategies, the growth of institutional ownership in the stock market helps to explain some
recent changes in stock return behavior. For example, Kamara (1997) finds that the de-
crease of Monday seasonality in stock returns can be explained by the increase of the ratio
of institutional to individual trading volume. Gompers and Metrick (2001) indicate that
the upward shifts on the institutional demand curve combined with institutional investors’
preference for large capitalization stocks can partly explain the disappearance of the equity
size premium since 1980. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to
empirically explore the relationship between institutional holdings and stock misvaluation
measures estimated by asset pricing models.
This paper is related to Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), who study the hedge fund
holdings of internet stocks during the Dot-com bubble period and find that hedge funds
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rode the up-trend of the Dot-com bubble and avoided losses by selling internet stocks before
the bubble burst. My paper extends their findings to all U.S. publicly traded stocks and
all institutional investors over a sample period 1980-2010. Furthermore, I use asset pricing
models to identify mispriced stocks and their degree of misvaluation while Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2004) use the top quintile P/S ratio to classify overpriced stocks. Admittedly,
any empirical mispricing test is in fact a joint test of stock misvaluation and the efficacy
of the model used to define stock fundamental value. To mitigate any concern about
the joint hypothesis, I identify stock misvaluation using alpha estimated by factor asset
pricing models and supplement it by two different metrics. My findings are not sensitive
to one-model misspecification.
My work is also related to the theoretical literature on the agency problem of dele-
gated portfolio management. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicate that most arbitrageurs
are professional investors who manage the fund for other wealthy individual investors, en-
dowments, and pensions. Due to the existence of agency problems, professional investors
may forgo some arbitrage opportunities that might incur short-term losses but have long-
term positive returns. In their model, the limited effectiveness of professional investors as
rational arbitrageurs reduces market efficiency. Among other theoretical works, Allen and
Gorton (1993) show that due to information asymmetry, fund managers have incentives to
churn asset prices in order to deceive their less informed clients. Fund managers may also
intentionally invest in overpriced stocks even though they may lose their clients’ money by
not exiting before a price correction. Dow and Gorton (1997) argue that conflicts of in-
terest between institutional investors and their clients may force fund managers to engage
in uninformed noise trading, because fund managers have incentives to pretend that they
are informed traders. Allen and Gale (2000) also find that investors may use borrowed
money to invest in risky assets and bid up asset prices because defaulting is always their
last resort. Goldman and Slezak (2003) indicate that fund managers lose the incentive to
trade on long-term information, when it takes longer to reveal their private information
than their tenure. This may cause rational prolonged stock mispricing. Abreu and Brun-
8
nermeier (2002, 2003) argue that the synchronization risk delays rational arbitrage and the
competition among institutional investors may force fund managers to invest in overvalued
assets with high past returns. This “keeping up with the Joneses” trading behavior leads
to excess volatility and market fragility. Hong et al. (2008) show that because of future
career concerns, even well-intentioned professional investment advisors may overstate their
estimates of new technology stock returns as a positive signal so that more investors will
follow them in the future.
Besides the above theoretical models, empirical studies show mixed evidence for the
role of institutional investors in stock misvaluation. Lakonishok et al. (1992) study 768
tax-exempt (mostly pension) funds, and find little evidence that these funds act as positive-
feedback traders or follow each other into and out of the same stocks. But Greenwood and
Nagel (2009) find that younger mutual fund managers invest more in technology stocks than
their older colleagues. They argue that the growth of inexperienced investors’ participation
on the stock market could have been a driving factor in the Dot-com bubble. Recent studies
on institutional momentum trading and herding (e.g., Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers,
1999; Badrinath and Wahal, 2002; Sias, 2004; Sias et al., 2006; Sias, 2007) also suggest
that institutional trading may lead to stock misvaluation. Grinblatt et al. (1995) also find
that institutions engaging in momentum trading perform better than other institutions,
indicating an incentive for institutional investors to ride stock misvaluation.
3. Hypothesis
Motivated by the growth of institutional ownership in the stock market, previous
literature has studied the role of institutions in stock market efficiency. The competing
theories and empirical evidence can be categorized into three groups: rational arbitrageur,
destabilizing trend chaser, and neutral on average.
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3.1. Rational Arbitrageur
According to the traditional view, institutional investors are rational arbitrageurs in
the stock market. They explore stock misvaluation opportunities and drive stock prices
back to their intrinsic value. In general, institutions are experienced investors and specialize
in trading stocks in certain industries. Compared with individual investors, institutions are
better informed and more resourceful. In addition, institutions have economies of scale in
aggregate trading and utilizing collective financial information, which greatly lower their
transaction costs. The traditional view predicts that institutions are more likely to sell
overvalued stocks and to buy undervalued stocks.
3.2. Trend Chaser
An opposite view on institutional investors is that they chase stock momentum and
ride stock misvaluation. Institutional investors have much larger holdings than individual
investors. If institutions herd, their trading has a much stronger effect on stock prices than
the trading of individual investors. However, institutional herding does not necessarily
destabilize stock prices unless they ride stock misvaluation. When institutional investors
ignore stock fundamental value and just mimic each other’s trades due to information
asymmetry and agency problems, for example, information cascades, fads, and reputational
herding, the institutional herding will push stock prices away from the fundamentals.
Previous empirical studies also document momentum trading initiated by institu-
tional investors. Following positive feedback trading strategies, institutional investors may
chase stock return trends and buy (sell) stocks after their prices rise (fall). Kaniel et al.
(2008) find that institutions are positive feedback traders on average, while individual in-
vestors tend to trade as negative feedback traders and provide liquidity for institutional
demand. Furthermore, institutional investors often use stop loss orders, which may force
them to sell stocks after a certain level of losses, regardless of their expectation of stock
future returns. Before the price correction, institutional investors are better off selling
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out near the peak or buying near the bottom than just trading against the trend. Even
though in the long run institutions drive stock prices back to fundamentals, trend chasing
by institutional investors still destabilizes stock prices.
3.3. Neutral on Average
The third view on institutional investors is that they are just neutral on average.
Because institutions are heterogenous, their trades may offset each other. As long as
the majority institutional demand and supply cancel out, institutional trading does not
affect stock return characteristics. Therefore, there is no significant relationship between
institutional trading and stock misvaluation.
Based on these three views, I state my three main hypothesis:
• Hypothesis (H0): Institutional investors are rational arbitrageurs on average.
Their aggregate trading drives stock prices back to fundamentals.
• Hypothesis (H1a): Institutional investors are trend chasers on average. They ride
stock misvaluation instead of trading against it.
• Hypothesis (H1a): Institutional investors trade with each other. Their orders
offset each other and have no net effect on stock prices.
4. Data
In this section, I briefly introduce my data sources and the definitions of institutional
ownership variables. For detailed information, please refer to the Appendix.
4.1. Data sources
My sample is collected from several data sources: (i) The institutional investor
stock holdings and institution types are from the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum 13F
database. (ii) Stock prices, share outstandings, and dividends are from the Center for
11
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily and monthly tapes for all NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks. (iii) Firms’ accounting data are collected from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT
merged database. Stock short interest and S&P 500 constitutes are collected from the
COMPUSTAT monthly file. (iv) Data on financial analysts’ earnings forecasts are retrieved
from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). (v) Data for the Fama–French
three factors, the Carhart momentum factor, and the Pastor–Stambaugh liquidity factor
are from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). (vi) Data for the betting against
beta factor is downloaded from Lasse H. Pedersen’s website. (vii) The Fama–French 49
industry classification is downloaded from Kenneth R. French’s website. Because institu-
tional ownership data in CDA/Spectrum can only be traced from 1980, my main sample
period is from 1980 to 2010.
4.2. Institutional ownership variable definitions
Next I describe how institutional ownership measurements are constructed in this
paper. Following the previous literature on institutional investors, I define the institu-
tional holding measure at the end of quarter t and their herding measures over quarter t,
respectively.
Measurement 1:
IOi,t =
N∑
j=1
Sharesj,i,t
Shares Outstandingi,t
Following Gompers and Metrick (2001), I define my main institutional holding mea-
surement IOi,t as the percentage level of institutional ownership of stock i at the end of
quarter t. N is the number of institutional investors who hold stock i at the end of quarter
t. Sharesj,i,t is the number of stock i shares held by institution j at the end of quarter
t. Shares Outstandingi,t is the total shares outstanding of stock i at the end of quarter
t. If stock i is not held by any institutions at the end of quarter t, then IOi,t is equal
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to zero.6 IOi,t is a cumulative institutional holding measure which is determined by the
aggregate institutional trading before the end of quarter t. The cross-sectional variation of
IOi,t indicates institutional investors’ preference for stock characteristics. The time series
of IOi,t reveals the change of institutional holdings of stock i with respect to the changes
of stock i’s characteristics.7
Measurement 2:
HMi,t = |pi,t − E[pi,t]| − E[|pi,t − E[pi,t]|]
BHMi,t = HMi,t|pi,t > E[pi,t]
SHMi,t = HMi,t|pi,t < E[pi,t]
pi,t =
Number of Institutions Buyingi,t
Number of Institutions Buyingi,t + Number of Institutions Sellingi,t
Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Wermers (1999) use HMi,t to investigate institutional
investor herding. This measure captures whether a disproportionate number of institutions
are buying or selling stock i over quarter t. pi,t is defined as the proportion of active traders
in stock i who are buyers. E[pi,t] is the expected proportion of institution buying stock
i over quarter t relative to the total number of active institutions. It is estimated as the
ratio of the number of institutional purchases to the total number of institutional active
trades at time t. E[|pi,t−E[pi,t]|] is an adjustment factor which allows for random variation
around the expected proportion of buyers under the null hypothesis of independent trading
decisions by institutions.8 HMi,t captures the tendency of a given subgroup of institutions
6Holdings that are less than $200,000 or 10,000 shares will not be reported. So there is a small downward
bias to IOi,t measurement, especially for small stocks. And we would expect a weak positive relationship
between IO and size due to this bias alone.
7In the unreported tests, other institutional trading measures such as the net dollar amount of insti-
tutional purchase divided by the total dollar amount of institutional trading for stock i over quarter t
(Lakonishok et al., 1992); standardized shares purchased by institutions (Sias, 2004); and the change in
the number of institutions holding stock i over quarter t (Jiang, 2010) are studied. Qualitatively similar
results are generated.
8Subtracting this adjustment factor addresses the concern that stocks that are not actively traded
lead to a positive difference between pi,t and E[pi,t] even if each institution trades independently. The
adjustment factor decreases with the number of institutions trading in the stock. It is easy to calculate the
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to trade stock i over quarter t together and in the same direction, which is more frequent
than would be expected by trading randomly and independently.
Based on HMi,t, I define two conditional institution trading measures: BHMi,t and
SHMi,t (Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 1999). BHMi,t (SHMi,t) is the conditional
buy-herding (sell-herding) measurement for stock i at the end of quarter t.9 These two
conditional measures separate institution herding into stocks from herding out of stocks.
A high BHMi,t (SHMi,t) suggests that the number of net buyers (sellers) of stock i over
quarter t is greater than the expected average.
5. Main results
5.1. The rise of institutional ownership in the U.S. stock market
Previous literature on institutional investors documents that the institutional owner-
ship of stock market increases gradually and has a positive time trend. Figure 1 displays
the time-series plots of institutional holdings and the number of institutions at the end of
every year from 1980 to 2010. Figure 1.1 presents the institutional holding scope relative
to the total stock market value. Following Gompers and Metrick (2001), the percentages
of market value held by all institutions, the 100 largest institutions, the 10 largest in-
stitutions, and the largest institution covered in the Thomson Reuters 13F database at
the end of each year are presented. Institutional holdings have increased steadily over
my sample period and the growth in the largest institutions accounted for most of the
total institutional holding growth. In December 1980, the largest 100 institutions owned
slightly above 20% of the stock market. In December 2005, the market share of the top
100 institutional holdings exceeded 50% of the total stock market value. Figure 1.2 plots
adjustment factor numerically given that the number of institutional buying follows a Binomial distribution
with probability E[pi,t] of success and the total number of active institutions. Please find the detailed
information about this measure in Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Wermers (1999).
9The adjustment factors in BHMi,t and SHMi,t are recalculated conditional on pi,t > E[pi,t] or pi,t <
E[pi,t]. That is, I separate all stock-quarters into a buy-herding subsample or a sell-herding subsample,
then calculate BHMi,t and SHMi,t separately in two subsamples.
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institutional holdings by five institution types: Bank, Insurance Company, Investment
Company (mutual fund), Independent Investment Advisor (including hedge fund), and All
Others (endowment, pension, and foundation). From 1980 to 1997, investment companies
and independent investment advisors significantly increased their holdings relative to the
other three types of institutions.10 Figure 1.3 tracks the number of institutions in my
sample. The total number of institutions has quintupled and recently approached 3,000.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for institutional holdings and stocks covered
in my sample. Panel A of Table 1 shows that the total stock market value grew more
than 10 times from 1980 to 2010. During the same time period, the dollar amount of
institutional holdings grew approximately 20 times, from $460 billion to $10,058 billion.
As a result, institutional holdings accounted for almost 70% of total stock market value
in December 2010, nearly doubled from 35% in December 1980. After 1995 institutions
controlled more than half of the stock market, and in recent years they eventually became
the dominating participants. Panel B of Table 1 reports the mean numbers of institutions
and stocks covered in my sample. On average, my sample contains 4,604 stocks and 1,426
institutions each quarter. The time-series mean of the cross-sectional average of institu-
tional holdings indicates that a representative institution holds 219 stocks in a portfolio
with $2.5 billion market value. Panel C of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the
number of institutional owners per stock at the end of each year. All the stocks included in
Panel C have at least one institutional owner. The average number of institutional owners
for one stock has increased from 27 in December 1980 to 156 in December 2010.
Overall, institutional investors have achieved a domination of the U.S. stock market
over my sample period. The largest institutions exercise discretionary control of most
institutional holdings. It is interesting to investigate the institutional holdings of mispriced
stocks.
10Because institution type codes are not accurate after 1998 in the Thomson Reuters 13F database, the
time span of Figure 1.2 is only between 1980 and 1997. And the sample period for all the empirical results
about institutional investor types is between 1980 and 1997.
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5.2. Three measures of stock misvaluation
The efficient market theory suggests that no investor can consistently achieve risk
adjusted returns above the average market returns, given all the information available at
the time of investment. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) recognize that if the stock market
is perfectly efficient, then investors would lose the incentive to collect and analyze infor-
mation. They argue that stock market frictions, such as transaction costs and asymmetric
information, lead to stock market inefficiency. Recent research on stock overvaluation also
indicates that the aggregate effect of differences of opinions and short sale constraints may
cause stock overvaluation. In this paper, I study the institutional holdings of misvalued
stocks. So it is important to identify the stock candidates that are the most likely to be
overvalued or undervalued during my sample period. Admittedly, stock fundamental value
is never observed by investors and any test of misvaluation suffers from the joint hypoth-
esis problem that either the asset pricing model is incorrect or the stock is mispriced. To
mitigate the concern of such a joint hypothesis, three generalized metrics extensively used
in the previous literature to identify stock misvaluation are applied in this paper.
5.2.1. Factor asset pricing model alpha
The first method is to fit individual stock monthly returns to factor asset pricing
models directly. Stocks with significantly negative alphas are overvalued and stocks with
significantly positive alphas are undervalued. I use the six-factor model that augments
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model by the Carhart (1997) momentum factor,
the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor, and the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)
betting against beta factor in my main analysis:
Rp,t −Rf,t =αp + βp(Rm,t −Rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + upUMDt + lpLt
+ bpBABt + p,t
(1)
The first five factors have been extensively used in the previous empirical asset pric-
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ing literature. Sias (1996) documents a positive contemporaneous relationship between
institutional ownership level and the stock return volatility. To account for the volatility
bias and volatility premium (e.g., Asness et al., 2014; Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014), I also
include the betting against beta factor in the factor model. Both five-year and three-year
rolling windows are checked over the sample period from January 1980 to December 2010.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the number of nonzero alpha stocks. Panel
A shows that on average there are 256 stocks with significantly negative alpha and 433
stocks with significantly positive alpha if monthly stock returns are fitted to the six-factor
model with a five-year rolling window. And Panel B shows that on average there are 377
stocks with significantly negative alpha and 461 stocks with significantly positive alpha if
monthly stock returns are fitted to the six-factor model with a three-year rolling window.
The significance level I choose is 10% at each tail.
5.2.2. Valuation ratios
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Greenwood and Nagel (2009) use the ratio of
price-to-sales (P/S) to identify overvalued internet stocks during the Dot-com bubble pe-
riod. They find that the P/S ratio captures technology industry stocks with an extreme
valuation. Following these two studies, I use the P/S and the ratio of price-to-earnings
(P/E) as the second method to identify misvalued stocks.11 Each month, all stocks are
sorted into quintile or decile portfolios based on the level of valuation ratios at the end
of the previous month. Stocks in the top (bottom) quintile or decile portfolios have the
highest (lowest) valuation ratios and are most likely to be overvalued (undervalued). Both
the equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) monthly returns for these portfolios
11The P/S ratio is a valuation metric for stocks. It is calculated by dividing the company’s market cap
by its total sales over a 12-month period. The P/E ratio is a ratio for valuing a company that measures
its current share price relative to its per-share earnings. In unreported tests, I also check the other three
widely used valuation ratios: the Price-to-Book ratio (P/B); the Price-to-Cash Flow ratio (P/CF ); and
the Price-to-Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (P/EBITDA). The results
are similar to P/E.
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are calculated. Then I estimate the six-factor model alphas for these portfolios.12
Table 3 presents the quintile and decile portfolio alphas, estimated by the six-factor
model over my sample period. The first row of Panel A shows that for both P/S and
P/E, the six-factor model alphas are all significantly negative for top quintile portfolios,
indicating that the stocks with the highest valuation ratios are indeed overvalued. The
second row of Panel A shows that, for P/S, the six-factor model alphas are significantly
positive for bottom quintile portfolios, suggesting that stocks with the lowest P/S are
indeed undervalued. However, alphas for bottom quintile portfolios sorted by P/E are
also significantly negative. These results are mainly driven by the fact that firms with
negative earnings are included in the bottom quintile portfolio, but stocks with negative
valuation ratios are more likely to be overvalued than stocks with the highest positive
valuation ratios.
I use two methods to mitigate the negative valuation ratio issue. The first method
is to exclude the observations with negative P/E ratios from the sample. The third and
fourth rows of Panel A report the alphas of Quintile 5 and Quintile 1 portfolios formed
by only sorting stocks with only positive P/E ratios. The alternative method is to adjust
the negative valuation ratios so that stocks with negative valuation ratios are assigned to
top valuation ratio portfolios. I choose the negative earnings yield (E/Y ratio).13 The
fifth and sixth rows of Panel A report the alphas of Quintile 5 and Quintile 1 portfolios
formed by sorting stocks according to their negative earnings yields (E/P ). Using these two
alternative methods to sort stocks, I find that Quintile 5 (1) portfolios have significantly
negative (positive) alphas, suggesting that stocks in Quintile 5 (1) portfolio are overvalued
(undervalued).
12There is a general agreement by most researchers that internet stocks in the Dot-com bubble period
were overvalued. So it is reasonable for Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) to use a high P/S ratio to identify
overpriced stocks during this period. However, whether the high P/S ratio stocks over my sample period
are overvalued remains uncertain. The factor model alpha is a more rigorous misvaluation measurement
than the valuation ratios.
13I thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. I add a negative sign to the earnings yield so that
overvalued stocks can be sorted into the top quintile or decile portfolios.
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Panel B of Table 3 show the alphas of ten decile portfolios formed by sorting P/S
and adjusted P/E. The results indicate a clear pattern that estimated six-factor model
alphas decrease almost monotonically from significantly positive in Decile 1 portfolios to
significantly negative in Decile 10 portfolios.
5.2.3. Differences of opinions and short sale constraints
Miller (1977) shows that heterogenous expectations across investors may lead to stock
overvaluation if short sale constraints on overvalued stocks prevent investors with negative
information from getting access to the stock market. Motivated by Miller’s theory, both
theoretical (e.g., Chen et al., 2002; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) and empirical studies
(e.g., Diether et al., 2002; Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Ofek and Richardson, 2003; Boehmer
et al., 2006) conclude that differences of investor opinions and short sale constraints can
together cause stock overvaluation or bubbles. Therefore, my third method to identify
overvalued stocks is a two-dimensional criterion including one proxy variable for differences
of opinions and one proxy variable for short sale constraints.
The ideal measure of stock short sale constraints is the stock short sale rebate rate
which is not available in public database so far (Jones and Lamont, 2002; Boehmer et al.,
2006).14 However Boehmer et al. (2006) document a positive relationship between the
short sale rebate fee and the short interest (SI) for the same stocks.15 So I use SI as the
proxy variable for short sale constraints in my main analysis. The arguably best proxy for
differences in investor opinions is the standard deviation of the I/B/E/S analyst earnings
forecast (Diether et al., 2002). But this proxy is only available for stocks covered by at
least two analysts, which may cause sample bias against small firm stocks with little analyst
14Jones and Lamont (2002) argue that the rebate rate measures the price of short selling a stock that
equilibrates supply and demand in the borrowing market. The higher the short sale rebate rate, the more
expensive to short sell the corresponding stock.
15Boehmer et al. (2006) also use the stock option status as a supplementary variable to estimate the stock
short sale rebate fee. The option status data in my sample is only available after 1998, so I only include
the option status variable in my robustness tests. Boehmer et al. (2006) find that SI has significantly
higher explanatory power than the option status variable, and excluding the option status variable does
not qualitatively affect my results.
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coverage. Following Boehmer et al. (2006), I use the following regression model to estimate
a unitary Dispersioni,t proxy variable:
Dispersioni,t = Constant+ β1SIGMAi,t + β2SIGMA
2
i,t + β3TURNOV ERi,t
+ β4TURNOV ER
2
i,t + i,t
(2)
where Dispersioni,t is the standard deviation of the I/B/E/S analyst earnings forecast
normalized by the mean of the earnings forecast. SIGMAi,t is the standard deviation
of the error term in the CAPM model, estimated over a three-month window for stock
i’s daily returns before time t; and TURNOV ERi,t is the trading volume normalized
by the shares outstanding of stock i over the previous three months. Regression (2) is
estimated for stocks covered by at least two analysts. Then the regression coefficients are
used to calculate the Dispersioni,t proxy for all the stocks with available SIGMAi,t and
TURNOV ERi,t data.
Due to the non-stationarity in the SIGMAi,t and TURNOV ERi,t, I follow Boehmer
et al. (2006) and sort all the stocks into twenty groups by their actual Dispersioni,t,
SIGMAi,t, and TURNOV ERi,t value at each month. Then I use the rank of the group to
which stock i is assigned as the value of the variables in regression (2). So all Dispersioni,t,
SIGMAi,t, and TURNOV ERi,t take discrete values from 1 to 20 in regression (2). The
actual values of the variables are also tested in regression (2) as a robustness check.
Next I sort all stocks by the estimated Dispersioni,t proxy into five quintile portfolios
at each month. I further divide each quintile portfolio into five subgroups by using SIi,t.
The stocks in the portfolio Quintile 5 & Quintile 5 (Q5 & Q5) with the highest Dispersioni,t
and SIi,t are most likely to be overvalued. Then I calculate monthly returns for the portfolio
Q5 & Q5 and fit the returns to the six-factor model. For comparison, I repeat the same
analysis for portfolio Quintile 1 & Quintile 1 (Q1 & Q1) with the lowest Dispersioni,t and
SIi,t ranks. Both EW and VW portfolio returns are tested. And because the number of
stocks in the portfolio varies from month to month, I use both ordinary least squares (OLS)
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and weighted least squares (WLS) in my analysis. The weights in the WLS regressions are
the number of stocks in portfolios every month.
Table 4 shows that the six-factor model alphas for portfolio Q5 & Q5 are all sig-
nificantly negative, indicating that the stocks with the highest Dispersioni,t and SIi,t are
indeed overvalued on average. The five factor model alphas for portfolio Q1 & Q1 are
significantly positive if the EW monthly returns are tested, suggesting that stocks with the
lowest Dispersioni,t and SIi,t are undervalued on average. However the six-factor model
alphas for portfolio Q1 & Q1 are not significant if the VW monthly returns are used,
suggesting that the undervalued stocks in Q1 & Q1 portfolios are mostly small firm stocks.
In summary, I use three methods to identify misvalued stocks in my sample. These
three methods together provide robust evidence that stock misvaluation persists during
my sample period, despite the fact that institutional investors have controlled the major
portion of the stock market. In the next section, I will investigate the institutional holdings
of these misvalued stocks.
5.3. Institutional holdings of misvalued stocks: Preliminary re-
sults
In this section, I present the preliminary statistics of institutional holdings of mis-
valued stocks. If institutional investors act as arbitrageurs, they should buy undervalued
stocks and sell overvalued stocks. As a result, institutional investors should hold fewer
overvalued stocks and more undervalued stocks using the market portfolio as the bench-
mark.
5.3.1. Institutional ownership and stock alpha
I first form portfolios using alphas estimated by the six-factor model with rolling
five-year windows. Each month, the overvalued portfolio includes all the stocks with sig-
nificantly (10%) negative alpha and the undervalued portfolio includes all the stocks with
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significantly (10%) positive alpha. In Figure 2, I compare the weights of these misvalued
stocks on the aggregate institutional investor portfolio to the weights of these misvalued
stocks on the market portfolio. The top panel of Figure 2.1 shows that institutional in-
vestors invest more (less) on the significantly negative alpha stocks when the weights of
these overvalued stocks in the market portfolio increase (decrease). The bottom panel of
Figure 2.1 shows the difference between the weights of overvalued stocks in the institutional
investor portfolio and the weights of overvalued stocks in the market portfolio. For most
of the time periods, this difference is positive. There is no evidence that the aggregate in-
stitutional investor underweighs these overvalued stocks in her portfolio using the market
portfolio as a benchmark.
Similarly, the top panel of Figure 2.2 shows that institutional investors do not over-
weigh undervalued stocks in their portfolio relative to the market portfolio either. The
bottom panel of Figure 2.2 shows the difference between the weights of undervalued stocks
in the institutional investor portfolio and the weights of undervalued stocks in the mar-
ket portfolio. For only about half of the sample period, institutional investors hold more
undervalued stocks in their portfolio than the market does in the market portfolio. The
maximum difference is slightly above 0.05%, much lower than the weight levels of under-
valued stocks in both institutional investor portfolio and the market portfolio.
Next, I compare the institutional holdings of stocks with significantly positive alpha
to institutional holdings of stocks with significantly negative alpha. The previous litera-
ture shows that institutional ownership increases with firm size and that large firm stocks
have outperformed small firm stocks since 1980 (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Therefore
I divide all stocks into 5 quintile groups by their market value at each quarter. In each
quintile group, I calculate the time-series mean of the cross-sectional average of institu-
tional ownership IO for significantly positive alpha stocks and significantly negative alpha
stocks. Alphas are estimated by using the six-factor model with rolling five-year windows
and rolling three-year windows. Panel A of Table 5 shows that institutional investors hold
more significantly negative alpha (overvalued) stocks than significantly positive alpha (un-
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dervalued) stocks in Quintile 1–3 groups. The mean difference tests show that IOs are
significantly different at 1% between positive alpha and negative alpha groups. Only in
the Quintile 5, that includes the largest stocks, are the results reversed.
5.3.2. Institutional ownership and stock valuation ratios
Following Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), I treat all institutions as one giant institu-
tional investor. Then I assign stocks to ten decile portfolios by P/S, P/E with only positive
value, respectively. The weights of the top and bottom decile valuation ratio portfolios on
the aggregate institutional investor portfolio are derived at the end of each quarter. As a
benchmark, the quarterly weights of the top and bottom decile valuation ratio portfolios
on the market portfolio are also calculated. As shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, the
red dotted lines represent the time-series weights of top or bottom decile portfolio stocks
on the aggregate institutional investor’s portfolio. And the blue solid lines represent the
time-series weights of top or bottom decile portfolio stocks on the market portfolio. If the
aggregate institutional investor keeps buying undervalued stocks and selling overvalued
stocks, the red dotted lines should be above (below) the blue solid lines with a significant
gap for all bottom (top) decile portfolio figures.
However, the graphs on the left column of Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show that
the aggregate institutional investor does not overweigh undervalued stocks in its portfolio
compared to the market portfolio. The graphs on the right column of Figure 3.1 and Figure
3.2 show that the aggregate institutional investor does not underweigh overvalued stocks
in its portfolios compared to the market portfolio either. In fact, both weight curves move
concurrently over time in Figure 3.1 and 3.2. When overvalued stock portfolio weights in
the market portfolio increase, the aggregate institutional investor also increases the weights
of overvalued stocks in its portfolio.
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) find that hedge funds generally overweigh technology
stocks in their portfolios and most of the technology stocks do not even have positive
earnings during the Dot-com bubble period. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) use the top
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quintile P/S to classify overpriced internet stocks. During their sample period from March
1998 to December 2000, 53% of top quintile P/S stocks have negative P/E, suggesting
that Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004)’s findings may be mainly driven by the negative
valuation ratio stocks. At the end of each quarter, I sort all negative P/E stocks into one
portfolio. The ratios of the market value of negative P/E stock portfolio to the market
portfolio value are calculated at quarterly end as benchmarks. The ratios of the market
value of negative P/E stock portfolio held by institutions to the market value of aggregate
institutional investors’ portfolio are also calculated at quarterly end. Figure 3.3 shows
that over my sample period 1980-2010, there is no evidence that institutional investors
underweigh negative P/E stocks in their portfolio comparing to the market portfolio.
The preliminary summary statistics also show similar results. Panel B of Table 5
presents the time-series mean of the cross-sectional average of institutional holding mea-
surements on portfolios formed by valuation ratios. Comparing the institutional holding
measurements on top quintile valuation ratio portfolios with bottom quintile valuation
ratio portfolios, I find no evidence that institutions hold more undervalued stocks than
overvalued stocks on average. The t-tests that IOs are lower in overvalued portfolios (Q5)
than in undervalued portfolios (Q1) are not significant.16
5.3.3. Institutional ownership of misvalued stocks identified by dispersion of
opinions and short sale constraints
In Panel C of Table 5, I present the time-series mean of the cross-sectional average of
institutional ownership on stock portfolios formed by the dispersion of opinion proxy and
short sale constraint proxy. My previous tests have shown that stocks with the highest
(lowest) dispersion of opinion and the highest (lowest) short sale constraints tend to be
overvalued. But I do not find evidence that institutional investors hold fewer shares in
portfolio D10 & D10 than D1 & D1. D10 & D10 represents the top decile dispersion
16In unreported tests, I use the cross-sectional median of institutional holding measures and find quali-
tatively similar results.
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of opinions and top decile short sale constraints. D1 & D1 represents the bottom decile
dispersion of opinions and bottom decile short sale constraints.
In summary, the preliminary summary statistics by tabulation suggest that there is
no evidence of institutions putting more weights on undervalued stocks than overvalued
stocks. However, Gompers and Metrick (2001) suggest that institutional investors prefer
to hold stocks with certain characteristics. The preliminary results are not conclusive. It is
necessary to test the relationship between institutional ownership and stock misvaluation
measures using multivariate analysis.
5.4. Institutional holdings and stock misvaluation: Multivariate
analysis
In this section, I investigate the relationship between institutional holdings and indi-
vidual stock misvaluation using multivariate regressions. At the end of each quarter over
my sample 1980–2010, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression:
IOi = Ci + βαalphai + βiXi + i (3)
where IOi is the percentage of institutional ownership on stock i, and alphai is estimated
by the six-factor model with rolling five-year windows.17 Xi is the vector of stock character-
istics used in Gompers and Metrick (2001), including Size, B/M , DividendY ield, Price,
previous two-year monthly return V olatility, Momentum1 for the past three months,
Momentum2 for the nine-month period before the past three months, share Turnover,
and S&P 500 dummy.18 To account for heteroskedastic errors, I use White robust error
estimators for the standard error estimations in all regressions (White, 1980).
In regression (3), alphai represents a measure of stock misvaluation over the past five
17My results are robust for alphai estimated by the six-factor model with rolling three-year windows
and the four-factor model with five-year rolling windows. In the rest of this paper, I will only report the
results based on alphai estimated by the six-factor model with rolling five-year windows.
18See detailed definition in Appendix A.2.3.
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years. When the dependent variable is institutional ownership IOi, a cumulative measure
of institutional ownership on misvalued stocks, regression (3) investigates the long-term
relationship between institutional holdings and stock misvaluation. When the dependent
variable is BHMi or SHMi, regression 3 investigates institutional investors’ quarterly
response to the level of stock misvaluation over the past five years.
5.4.1. Cross-sectional regressions by quarter
I first estimate cross-sectional regressions separately for each quarter over my whole
sample period. Because the regression coefficients are not independent across quarters, I
do not report any other time-series statistics other than the coefficient average.
Panel A of Table 6 reports average regression coefficients, the number of positive and
negative coefficients, and the number of significant (5%) positive or negative coefficients
for all the quarterly OLS regression (3). The dependent variable is institutional ownership
IO and the independent variable alphai is the significant alpha dummy, which is equal to
1 (–1) if the actual alpha is positive (negative) and significant at 10%. The results show
that there is a consistently negative relationship between institutional ownership and stock
alpha. For 86 out of 105 quarters, the relationship between institutional ownership and
stock alpha is negative; and 61 out of 86 negative coefficients are significant at the 5%
level.
In Panel B and Panel C of Table 6, I change the dependent variable into institutional
buy-herding measure BHM and institutional sell-herding measure SHM . The results show
that institutional investors are more likely to herd into (out of) stocks with significantly
negative (positive) alphas.19
19In unreported analysis, I use different alpha measurements such as actual value of significant alpha,
significant actual alpha lag by 1 quarter, alpha dummy for all stock observations including statistically
insignificant alpha, and actual stock alpha for all stock observations. Qualitatively similar results have
been found.
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5.4.2. Pooled regressions with double-clustered standard errors by firm and
quarter
The residual terms in regression (3) usually have time-series autocorrelation over
long horizons. Therefore, I adjust the standard errors for cross-sectional and time-series
correlation in the residual terms by a pooled regression with two-way (firm and quarter)
clustering of standard errors (Petersen, 2009).
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of pooled regressions in which the dependent
variable is institutional ownership IO. In column (1), the independent variable alphai is the
significant alpha dummy, which is equal to 1 (−1) if the actual alpha is positive (negative)
and significant at 10%. The coefficient of the significant alpha dummy is −0.031 and
significant at 1%, suggesting that the institutional ownership is 6.2% higher in overvalued
stocks than undervalued stocks controlling for other stock characteristics. In column (2) of
Panel A, the independent variable alphai is the actual value of significant alpha estimated
by the six-factor model with five-year rolling windows. The coefficient of actual alpha
is −0.79 and significant at 1%, suggesting that the institutional ownership on misvalued
stocks increases by 0.79% when the actual alpha decreases by 1%. From column (3) to
column (5), the independent variables alphai are the significant actual alpha lagged by
1 quarter, the dummy alpha for all observations including the statistically insignificant
alpha, and the actual alpha for all observations. All the coefficients of alpha variables are
negative and statistically significant at 1%. These results show that institutional holdings
are higher in overvalued stocks than undervalued stocks cross-sectionally, controlling for
other stock characteristics.20
In Panel B of Table 7, the dependent variables are the institutional buy-herding
measure BHM . All five coefficients of the alpha variables in Panel B are negative and
significant above the 10% level. These suggest that for all the stocks which institutions
buy, the herding intensity on overvalued stocks is higher than on undervalued stocks,
20In unreported tests, I get similar results when I use the six-factor three-year rolling alphas and five-
factor five-year rolling alphas.
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controlling for other stock characteristics. In Panel C of Table 7, the dependent variables
are the institutional sell-herding measure SHM . All five coefficients of the alpha variables
are positive and three are significant above the 10% level. The coefficients for the actual
significant alpha in column (2) and alpha lag in column (3) are positive but not significant.
These results indicate that for all the stocks which institutions sell, the herding intensity
on undervalued stocks is higher than on overvalued stocks, controlling for other stock
characteristics.
In Table 8, I show that the cross-sectional relationship between institutional holdings
and stock alphas differs across institution types. Following Kamara et al. (2008), I separate
all institutional investors into three groups: banks and insurance companies, investment
companies and independent investment advisors, and all others (pension funds, university
endowments, foundations) over the sample period 1980–1997. Among these three groups,
investment companies and independent advisors trade the most frequently and are the
least risk averse. Therefore, it is expected that investment companies and independent
advisors are most likely to ride stock misvaluation. Pension funds, university endowments,
and foundations are the most risk averse among these three groups due to strict regu-
lation and laws. Therefore, they tend to be the long-term investors and are least likely
ride stock overvaluation. The results in Table 8 show that all the coefficients on alphas
are significantly negative, suggesting that all three institution groups ride stock overvalu-
ation. Consistent with my expectations, the negative coefficients of alphas for investment
firms and independent investment companies are lower than for the other two institution
groups. The coefficients of alphas for all other groups are the smallest in absolute value,
which indicates that institutions in all other groups have the least tendency to ride stock
overvaluation. During the Dot-com bubble period, almost all institutions increased their
exposure to overvalued internet stocks. But due to the restrictions on investment class
and riskiness, pension funds, university endowments, and foundations invested relatively
less in the overvalued internet stocks than institutions in the other two groups. Ofek and
Richardson (2003) find evidence that pension funds underweigh internet stocks in their
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portfolios more than the other investors.
5.5. Time-series relationship between institutional holdings and
stock misvaluation
I next investigate the time-series relationship between institutional holdings and the
degree of stock overvaluation. I have already shown that the top decile and quintile valu-
ation ratio portfolios are overvalued. In the following tests, I focus on the VW, P/S top
quintile portfolio. At each quarter, I record the time-series degree of overvaluation on the
portfolio: alphat estimated by the six-factor model with rolling five-year windows. The
average institutional ownership measure IO on the portfolio is also recorded.
Because institutional holdings increase over time, I use the following regression to
test whether the time series of IOt and alphat are stationary and whether they have a time
trend (Dickey and Fuller, 1979):
Yt − Yt−1 = C + (λ− 1)Yt−1 + βT + i (4)
Panel A of Table 9 shows that the coefficients of lag IOt and alphat are both significantly
different from zero, indicating that they are both stationary. The coefficient of time T for
IOt is statistically significant, which is consistent with the fact that institutional owner-
ship increases over time. I therefore use the time trend coefficient 0.001 to calculate the
detrended IO series.
Panel B of Table 9 shows that the detrended IO is negatively correlated with the
alphat of the portfolio with top quintile P/S or P/E. When the abnormal return alphat
decreases (increases), stocks become more overvalued (undervalued) and the average in-
stitutional holdings also increase. These findings confirm that on average institutions ride
stock overvaluation. In Panel C of Table 9, I use the significantly negative alpha stock
portfolio as the overvalued portfolio and the significantly positive alpha stock portfolio as
the undervalued portfolio. Column (1) shows that when the overvalued portfolio alpha
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decreases, the detrended institutional investor holdings of the overvalued portfolio will
increase. Column (2) shows that when the undervalued portfolio alpha increases, insti-
tutional investors do not significantly increase their weights on the undervalued portfolio.
Panel C suggests that institutional investors ride stock overvaluation and that they do not
significantly change their holdings respond to stock undervaluation.
6. Robustness tests
6.1. Adjust for overlapping alpha by Hansen–Hodrick standard
errors
The main misvaluation measurement variable alpha is estimated by the six-factor
model with rolling five-year windows. Because the rolling regressions are based on monthly
stock return data, the alpha estimators suffer an overlapping problem. The overlapping
of alpha estimations creates a moving average error term. Therefore coefficients estimated
by OLS regressions would be inefficient and hypothesis tests would be biased (Hansen and
Hodrick, 1980).
Following Hansen and Hodrick (1980), I estimate regression (3) by calculating the
Hansen–Hodrick standard errors, and re-calculate the t-ratios for all the regression coeffi-
cients.21 The Hansen–Hodrick standard error estimator is heteroskedasticity and autoco-
variance consistent (HAC) and provides asymptotically valid hypothesis tests for overlap-
ping data. Because institutional ownership variables are at a quarterly frequency and alpha
is estimated by a rolling five-year window, the alpha estimators are in fact overlapped by 19
quarters. Table 10 shows that the relationship between institutional ownership and stock
alpha are still significantly negative for all five regressions after adjusting the standard
errors for overlapping alpha estimation.
21All the coefficients remain the same as in the Panel A of Table 7. Only the standard errors of coefficients
and the p-values may change when using Hansen–Hodrick standard errors.
30
6.2. Average institutional ownership and stock rolling five-year
alpha
In regression (3), the independent variable alphat is estimated by the six-factor model
over a rolling five year window between t − 5 year and t. Alpha should measure stock
misvaluation over the five-year period before time t. Therefore, I replace the dependent
variable IO by IOAverage, the average of 20 quarterly institutional ownership IO between
year t− 5 and year t. Table 11 shows that there is still a significantly negative relationship
between IOAverage and alpha for all alpha measures. The coefficient of the significant
alpha dummy is −0.053 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the five-year
average institutional ownership is 10.6% higher in overvalued stocks than undervalued
stocks controlling for other stock characteristics. The coefficient of the actual alpha is
−1.70 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the five-year average institutional
ownership in misvalued stocks increases by 1.70% as the actual alpha decreases by 1%.
IOAveragei,t =
∑t
t−19 IOi,t
20
(5)
6.3. Institution fund inflow
One alternative explanation of my results is that individual investors invest more
in institutions that ride stock misvaluation than institutions that do not. For example,
during the Dot-com bubble period individual investors invested more in institutions that
put more weight on technology stocks. To rule out this alternative explanation, I divide
my sample into “high-inflow” and “low-inflow” quarters. Following Gompers and Metrick
(2001), I define the institution fund inflows as the quarterly change in the total value of
aggregate institutional holdings without any price appreciation or depreciation effects:
Inflowt =
∑N
i (MVi,t−1 ∗ 4IOi,t)∑N
i MVi,t−1
(6)
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where N is total number of stocks at time t− 1, MVi,t−1 is stock i’s market value at time
t − 1, and 4IOi,t is the change in institutional ownership in stock i from time t − 1 to
t. Using the Inflowt measure, I sort all quarters in my sample and define the top half as
“high inflow” and the bottom half as “low inflow”. Regression (3) is estimated for both
subsamples by using the Fama and Macbeth (1973) method and the pooled regression.
Table 12 shows that the absolute value of coefficients on stock misvaluation measures in
high-inflow quarters is less than its absolute value in low-inflow quarters. These results
suggest that the action of institutional investors riding stock misvaluation is not driven by
individual investors.
6.4. Subperiod analysis
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) find that hedge funds rode stock overvaluation during
the Dot-com bubble. In order to preclude the possibility that my results are mainly driven
by institutions speculating on internet stocks during that period, I exclude the observations
between 1997 and 2001 from my sample. Untabulated results show that both cross-sectional
and time-series test results for the remaining sample are similar to what I report in this
paper.
Another concern of my finding is that institutions’ tendency to ride stock misvaluation
may change over time. For example, the number of hedge funds and mutual funds increased
significantly after the late 1990s. To address this concern, I separate my sample into two
subperiods, 1980–1994 and 1995–2010, and repeat my multivariate regression analysis for
each subperiod. Table 13 presents the results and indicates that institutional investors
had a higher tendency to ride stock misvaluation during the 1995–2010 subperiod, when
mutual funds and hedge funds were more popular in the U.S. stock market. But my key
results remain qualitatively similar during the 1980–1994 subperiod. Neither the Dot-com
bubble nor the composition change of institutions drive the findings of this study.
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6.5. Industry-specific or firm-specific?
During my sample period, certain industries went through overvaluation for a sus-
tained period, for example, the technology industry in the late 1990s and the real estate
industry in the late 2000s. Following the Fama–French 49 industry definition, I assign
each stock in my sample to a corresponding industry based on its four-digit SIC code
every quarter. I then check the multivariate regression (3) of institutional ownership on
stock alphas within each industry. To include more observations in each industry, I choose
alphadummy as my key independent variable, which is equal to 1 if the actual alpha is
positive and 0 otherwise. Table 14 shows that my findings that institutional investors
hold more overvalued stocks than undervalued stocks cross-sectionally are not driven by
only a few industries. Among the 49 Fama–French industries, the estimated coefficient
for alphadummy is significantly negative for 31 industries, insignificantly nagative for 15
industries, and insignificantly positive for the other 3 (Candy & Soda; Beer & Liquor;
and Entertainment). One possible explanation of this insignificance is the lack of observa-
tions. The other possible reason is that most of the industries with insignificantly negative
alphadummy coefficients or insignificantly positive coefficients are traditional industries
such as agricultural, defense, textiles, mining, etc. Stocks in these industries are relatively
easy to be priced and have less uncertainty.
6.6. Are institutional investors better off by investing in negative
alpha stocks?
This paper shows that institutional investors invest more in negative alpha stocks
than positive alpha stocks. Investment companies and independent investment advisors
also have a higher tendency to do so than the other institution types. The implication of
these results is that institutional investors ride stock misvaluation instead of trade against
the misvaluation immediately. The next question is whether the trend chasing strategies of
institutional investors are rational or not. That is, will the subsequent performance of the
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institutional investors be better off when institutional investors overweigh negative alpha
stocks in their portfolios?
The ideal answer is to track individual institutional investors’ time-series perfor-
mance. However, this method is not feasible in my data sample. Institutional investor
stock holdings are collected from the CDA/Spectrum S34 database that covers the entire
range of institutional investors in the U.S. stock market. Banks, insurance companies, par-
ents of mutual funds, pension funds, university endowments, and professional investment
advisors (hedge funds) are all included. The advantage of this database is its compre-
hensiveness. The findings in this paper can represent the trading strategies of the average
institutional investors in the U.S. stock market, not just a portion of institutional investors.
However both fund number (FUNDNO) and manager number (MGRNO) identifiers in the
CDA/Spectrum S34 database are re-used. According to the User’s Guide to Thomson
Reuters Mutual Fund and Investment Company Common Stock Holdings Databases on
WRDS, FUNDNO and MGRNO do not provide a unique and permanent identifier for
every fund or manager. The same FUNDNO or MGRNO usually represents a different
and unrelated fund or manger if there is more than a one-year gap in the report date of
stock holdings. For these reasons, the CDA/Spectrum S34 database has been rarely used
in the previous literature studying institutional investor performance over time.
One alternative method is to investigate the relationship between institutional own-
ership and stock forward looking alpha. I calculate the individual stock six-factor model
alphat from time t to t+5 years and the individual stock six-factor model alphat from time
t to t + 3 years. Then I check the relationship between institutional ownership at time t
and the five-year (three-year) forward looking alphas. Both the Fama and Macbeth (1973)
method and the pooled regression method are applied to estimate regression (3). Table
15 shows that institutional ownership and the stock forward alpha is positively correlated.
This positive relationship is significant when the forward three-year alpha is used, but in-
significant when the forward five-year alpha is used. If I divide institutional investors into
three types following Kamara et al. (2008), then the coefficients of forward alpha is larger
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for investment companies and independent investment companies than for the other two
types. All these results provide weak evidence that institutional investors riding stock mis-
valuation may generate a positive alpha in the future. Institutional investors are rational
trend chasers on average.
The other alternative method is to sort stocks into portfolios by their last quarter
institutional ownership and stock alpha, then the portfolio returns may indicate whether
institutional investors can make a profit by investing in negative alpha stocks. However, the
high institutional holdings portfolio tends to include more large company stocks because
institutional investors prefer to invest in firms of larger size (Gompers and Metrick, 2001).
In addition, institutional ownership has increased over my sample period. Therefore, I
control for both time and firm size in forming portfolios. I follow Field and Lowry (2009)
and employ the fractional logit methodology. Each quarter, I model the conditional mean
of institutional ownership percentage as a logistic function:
E(IOi,t | x) = exp{β1 + β2 ∗ Sizei,t}
1 + exp{β1 + β2 ∗ Sizei,t} (7)
where IOi,t is the institutional ownership for firm i at quarter t; Sizei,t is firm i’s log total
assets at quarter t. The parameters are estimated for each quarter. This method accounts
for the fact that institutional ownership has values between zero and one by definition. The
difference between actual institutional ownership and expected institutional ownership for
each firm is calculated as the unexpected institutional ownership.
I next assign a stock in a portfolio at each quarter if the stock’s unexpected insti-
tutional ownership is among the top 20% in the previous quarter and the stock’s alpha
estimated by the six-factor model over five-year windows is negative. Panel A of Table 16
shows the descriptive statistics for the portfolio quarterly returns and the number of stocks
in the portfolio. The average quarterly raw portfolio returns is 4.2% if the alpha dummy
is used when forming the portfolio and 5.1% if the significant alpha dummy is used when
forming the portfolio. Panel B of Table 16 shows the regression results of the portfolio
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quarterly returns based on the Fama–French three-factor model. To account for the stock
number changes in the portfolio, regressions are estimated by WLS regressions, in which
each quarterly return is weighted by the number of stocks in the portfolio. The intercept in
the regression measures any abnormal performance of the portfolio. The results show that
both portfolios have significantly positive abnormal returns. Overall, Table 16 indicates
that institutional investors do make a positive profit by riding stock misvaluation.
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates whether institutional investors ride or trade against stock
misvaluation. Using all the stocks covered by the CRSP between 1980 and 2010, I iden-
tify mispriced stocks by three general asset pricing models and study the institutional
holdings of these mispriced stocks. Cross-sectionally, the aggregate institutional investor
overweighs (underweighs) the overvalued (undervalued) stocks in its portfolio. The time-
series relationship between institutional holdings and the degree of stock overvaluation is
also significantly positive. Institutional investors dominate the U.S. stock market in terms
of both market share and trading volume. When stock misvaluation is still observed in
such an institutionalized market, the role of institutions as arbitrageurs is compromised.
Several extensions of this paper could be pursued in the future. Firstly, it is interest-
ing to study the relationship between fund mangers’ pay-performance contacts and their
holdings of mispriced stocks. Secondly, it is also interesting to investigate whether the
fund governance has any effect on the fund’s holdings of mispriced stocks. Thirdly, the
synchronization among the largest institutions and its effect on stock misvaluation can be
studied so that we can answer the question whether synchronization risk really delays ar-
bitrage. And lastly, if a panel data sample covers both institutional investor holdings and
their performance, then we may directly test the hypothesis that institutional investors are
better off to ride stock misvaluation.
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Appendix
Appendix A.1
This appendix describes my data sources and sample selection process.
Thomson CDA/Spectrum S34 Institutional Investor Ownership Data. The
backbone of my empirical tests is institutional investor stock holding data from Thomson
Reuters (also known as CDA/Spectrum S34). According to the 1978 amendment to the
Securities and Exchange Act 1934, all institutional investors with greater than $100 million
of securities under discretionary management must report their holdings to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in their 13F report. Thomson Reuters collects institu-
tional investor holding information from 13F filings to the SEC at each quarter end. There
are some exclusions in 13F filings: (1) Small holdings under 10, 000 shares or $200, 000; (2)
Holdings that are confidential for some particular reasons; (3) Holdings that could not be
matched with a master security file. I focus on the institutional investor report dates found
in the Thomson Reuters 13F dataset, and adjust the holding information if an institutional
investor’s file date is later than its report date.22 The 13F data sample period is from 1980
to 2010.
All institutions in the CDA/Spectrum S34 database are classified into five types: (1)
Bank, (2) Insurance company, (3) Investment Company (Mutual Fund), (4) Independent
Investment Advisor and (5) Others (e.g., Pension Fund, University Endowment, and Foun-
dation). The institution type information is not accurate after 1998. Therefore my studies
related to institutional investor types are restricted to the time period from 1980 to 1997.
CRSP Stock Price and Return Data. Stock prices, returns, and trading vol-
ume at month end, and daily end are obtained from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged
Database, which includes all U.S. ordinary common stocks (i.e., CRSP share code 10 or
11) listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. ADRs, REITS, closed end funds, and foreign
incorporated companies are excluded from my sample. I also collect stock dividend returns,
shares outstanding, trading volume, and firm market value from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT
Merged Database. To avoid any potential confounding effect of recent IPOs, only firms
that have been recorded on the CRSP for at least 12 months are included in my sample. To
alleviate the effect of bid–ask bounces on the empirical studies, I exclude stocks with prices
below $3 at the end of each month. To account for market maker activity in calculating
NASDAQ trading volume, I divide NASDAQ firms’ trading volume by two in the main
analysis (Atkins and Dyl, 1997).23 My CRSP sample period is from 1980 to 2011.
22The only reason to be concerned about the file date is that when the file date is later than the report
date and when stock splits occur between an institutional investor’s report date and file date. I recover
the correct number of holding shares as of the report date by using the CRSP share adjustment factors.
23NASDAQ overstating trading volume may no longer exist after 1997, because the SEC changed its
order-handling rules and trade-reporting rules after that date. In 2010, the SEC reported that by the mid-
2000s, more than 40 percent of NASDAQ transactions were being handled by Electronic Communication
Networks (ECNs). Since ECNs rarely double count their trades, reported volumes may not go up if some
ECN trading does not come from dealers. Anderson and Dyl (2005) find that NASDAQ volumes are still
biased (37%) in comparison to NYSE reported volumes for their sample period from 1997 to 2002, but not
by as much as they had been (50%). As a robustness check, I take NASDAQ firm’s trading volume as it
is and redo the analysis. This alternative specification does not significantly change my original findings.
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Corporate Accounting Data and Short Interest Data from COMPUSTAT.
Corporate accounting data, such as book equity, earnings, and cash flows, come from
COMPUSTAT. Short interest data for stocks listed on NYSE and NASDAQ, and S&P
500 index constitutes are also collected from the COMPUSTAT monthly file. The sample
period for COMPUSTAT data is from 1980 to 2011.
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts from I/B/E/S. Financial analysts’ earnings fore-
casts are retrieved from the I/B/E/S Unadjusted Summary File.24 The Unadjusted Sum-
mary File contains summary statistics on analyst earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. Mean,
median and standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts are included. I/B/E/S data
manual indicates that these data are all calculated on the third Thursday of each month
based on the individual records from the Unadjusted Detail History File. The sample
period is from 1980 to 2011.
Six-Factor Time-Series Data from the WRDS. From the WRDS, I collect
monthly time series data for excess return on the market portfolio Rm,t−Rf,t, the difference
between the average return on the three small firm portfolios and average return on the
three big firm portfolios SMBt, the difference between the average return on two high
book-to-market (value) stock portfolios and the average return on the two low book-to-
market (growth) stock portfolios HMLt, and the difference between the average return on
two high prior return portfolios and the average return on two low prior return portfolios
UMDt. These three factors are proposed by Fama and French (1993). The fourth factor
momentum is proposed by Carhart (1997). And the fifth factor which I collect from the
WRDS is Pastor–Stambaugh VW liquidity factor (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) with
monthly frequency. The sample period is from 1980 to 2010.
Fama–French 49 Industries from Kenneth R. French’s Website. Based on
stocks’ SIC codes, Fama and French assign each NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock to
an industry portfolio at the end of June. I use their 49 industry classification in my study.
The data is downloaded from Kenneth R. French’s website.
Appendix A.2
This appendix describes the definitions of variables used in my empirical tests.
Appendix A.2.1
This appendix describes how valuation ratios are constructed in this paper. The #s
in parentheses refer to data items from the COMPUSTAT quarterly file.
P: Share price from CRSP, at the end of each month.
24I/B/E/S also provides an Adjusted Summary File, which adjusts EPS for stock splits and stock
dividends since the date of forecasts to today. Although this adjustment makes today’s EPS comparable
with its historical values, it causes two issues. First, the rounding issue after the adjustment makes some
of the standard deviation and the mean of analysts’ EPS forecasts equal to zero. The adjustment distorts
the rank of the historical EPS. For example: firm A and B’s historical EPS are $1 and $1.49, respectively.
If both firms carry out a one-to-ten stock split after the historical EPS report date, then I/B/E/S adjusts
both firms’ EPS to be ten cents.
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S: Per share sales = sum of four consecutive quarterly sales (#12 saleq) deflated by shares
outstanding (#25 cshoq).
E: 12-month moving earnings per share (#58 epsx12) excluding extraordinary items.
Appendix A.2.2
This appendix describes how the proxy variables for dispersion of investor opinions
and short sale constraints are constructed:
SD(EPS) =
SD of EPS Estimation
ABS(Mean of EPS Estimation)
(8)
SD(EPS): normalized standard deviation of analyst’s EPS estimation. Data are collected
from the I/B/E/S Unadjusted Summary File. Diether et al. (2002) and Boehmer et al.
(2006) use this measure to capture dispersion of investor opinion.
SIGMA: the unsystematic risk term of stock returns. Following the Brown and Warner
(1985) market model, I run a CAPM regression over a rolling three-month window by using
daily stock excess returns and market excess returns. The standard deviations of the regres-
sion error terms are recorded at the end of each month. For a robustness check, I also use
a rolling six-month window and get similar results. Harrison and Raviv (1993) and Shalen
(1993) find that the return volatility is positively related to dispersion of I/B/E/S analysts’
EPS forecasts, and Boehmer et al. (2006) use SIGMA as one of their dispersion of investor
opinion proxies.
Turnover =
Trading Volume
Total Share Outstandings
(9)
Turnover: past one-month, three-month, six-month, and twelve-month trading volume.
Due to space availability, I only report results by using past three-month trading volume.
But my results are qualitatively similar by using other trading volume periods. Diether
et al. (2002), Boehmer et al. (2006) and Cao and Ou-Yang (2009) use this measure to
capture dispersion of investor opinion. Following the previous literature, the NASDAQ
trading volume is divided by two to account for market maker activity in calculating the
NASDAQ trading volume.25
SI =
Number of Shares Shorted
Total Shares Outstanding
(10)
SI: short interest. Figlewski (1981) finds that the unobserved demand to short a stock
rises with the observed short interest level and firms with high observed short interests are
more difficult to be shorted. Ofek and Richardson (2003) also find that short interest was
considerably higher for Internet stocks than for “old economy” firms during the period of
January 1998 to December 2000.
25See Atkins and Dyl (1997) for a detailed discussion of this practice.
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Appendix A.2.3
This appendix describes how control variables for stock characteristics are constructed
by following Gompers and Metrick (2001) with minor modifications.
Size: market capitalization at the end of quarter t.
B/M: most recent book value before quarter t, divided by Size at the end of quarter t.
Yield: dividend yield for the past 12 months before the end of quarter t.
Price: stock price per share at the end of quarter t
Volatility: the variance of monthly stock returns over the past 24 months before the end
of quarter t.
Momentum1: past three-month gross return before the end of quarter t.
Momentum2: past nine-month gross return preceding the beginning of Momentum1 mea-
surement period.
Turnover: trading volume at the end of quarter t− 1 divided by shares outstanding.
S&P 500: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a stock is in S&P 500 index, and 0
otherwise.
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Figure 2: Nonzero alpha stock in the institutional investor portfolio versus in the market
portfolio
Figure 2.1. Significantly negative alpha stocks. The top panel of Figure 2.1 presents the time
series weights of significantly negative alpha (overvalued) stocks in the institutional investor portfolio
and the weights of significantly negative alpha (overvalued) stocks in the market portfolio. The bottom
panel of Figure 2.1 presents the time series differences between the overvalued stock weights in the insti-
tutional investor portfolio and the overvalued stock weights in the market portfolio. Overvalued stocks
have significantly (10%) negative alphas estimated by the six-factor model with rolling five-year windows:
Rp,t−Rf,t = αp+βp(Rm,t−Rf,t)+spSMBt+hpHMLt+upUMDt+lpLt+bpBABt+p,t; where Rm,t−Rf,t,
SMBt, and HMLt are the Fama and French (1993) three factors; UMDt is the Carhart (1997) momentum
factor; Lt is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor; and BABt is the Frazzini and Pedersen
(2014) betting against beta factor.
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Figure 2.2. Significantly positive alpha stocks. The top panel of Figure 2.2 presents the time
series weights of significantly positive alpha (undervalued) stocks in the institutional investor portfolio
and the weights of significantly positive alpha (undervalued) stocks in the market portfolio. The bottom
panel of Figure 2.2 presents the time series differences between the undervalued stock weights in the
institutional investor portfolio and the undervalued stock weights in the market portfolio. Undervalued
stocks have significantly (10%) positive alphas estimated by the six-factor model with rolling five-year
windows: Rp,t −Rf,t = αp + βp(Rm,t −Rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + upUMDt + lpLt + bpBABt + p,t;
where Rm,t−Rf,t, SMBt, and HMLt are the Fama and French (1993) three factors; UMDt is the Carhart
(1997) momentum factor; Lt is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor; and BABt is the Frazzini
and Pedersen (2014) betting against beta factor.
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Figure 3: Weights of top and bottom valuation ratio decile portfolios in the institutional
investor portfolio versus in the market portfolio
Figure 3.1. P/S. At the end of each quarter, I sort stocks into ten decile portfolios by P/S. The ratios of
the market value of top (D10) and bottom decile (D1) portfolios to the market portfolio value are calculated
at quarterly end as benchmarks. The ratios of the market value of top and bottom decile portfolios held
by institutions to the market value of aggregate institutional investors’ portfolio are also calculated at
quarterly end. The sample period is from March 1980 to December 2010.
Figure 3.2. P/E (Positive only). At the end of each quarter, I sort stocks into ten decile portfolios
by P/E. Negative P/E stocks are excluded. The rest is similar to Figure 3.1
Figure 3.3. Negative P/E. At the end of each quarter, I sort all negative P/E stocks into one
portfolio. The ratio of the market value of negative P/E stocks to the market portfolio value are calculated
at quarterly end as benchmarks. The ratio of the market value of negative P/E stock portfolio held by
institutions to the market value of aggregate institutional investors’ portfolio are also calculated at quarterly
end. The sample period is from March 1980 to December 2010.
48
Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A. Time series of institutional holdings. This panel presents the number of reported insti-
tutional positions, the number of stocks on the market, the number of institutional investors, the total
market value of institutional holdings (billion dollars), the stock market value (billion dollars), and the
percentage of stock market share held by institutions. The sample period is from 1980 to 2010.
Year Reported
Positions
Number of
Stocks
Institution
Number
Market
Value of
Holdings
Total
Stock
Market
Value
Percentage
Dec-80 90,783 4,698 528 460.91 1,314.65 35.06%
Dec-85 158,129 5,724 769 886.83 2,086.00 42.51%
Dec-90 206,216 5,705 979 1,303.72 2,749.60 47.41%
Dec-95 324,175 6,952 1,302 3,299.82 6,317.43 52.23%
Dec-00 445,079 6,340 1,907 8,094.32 14,316.06 56.54%
Dec-05 510,220 4,758 2,399 9,874.37 14,795.22 66.74%
Dec-10 521,529 3,952 2,908 10,057.83 14,497.44 69.38%
Panel B. Descriptive statistics. This panel presents the descriptive statistics of institutional investors
and their holdings. In the first two rows, the number of institutional investors and the number of stocks
in the stock market are calculated at the end of each quarter, and the descriptive statistics of these two
time-series data are reported. In the last two rows, I calculate the cross-sectional average of the number
of stocks in institutional investors’ portfolios and the cross-sectional average of the total value of their
portfolio across institutions at the end of each quarter, respectively. Then the descriptive statistics of
time-series of cross-sectional averages are reported. The value of institutional holdings is in billion dollars.
The sample period is from 1980 to 2010.
Average Median S.D. Min. 25th 75th Max.
Number of institutions 1,436 1,203 740 466 839 1,922 2,907
Number of stocks 4,604 4,389 820 2,878 6,477 4,106 5,020
Number of stocks in institu-
tions portfolios
219 221 27 161 194 240 269
Value of institutional holdings
(billions)
2.54 0.32 1.34 0.66 0.75 2.27 5.23
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Panel C. The number of institutional investors per stock. This panel presents the summary
statistics for the number of institutional investors holding one stock at each year end. All stocks in the
summary statistics have at least one institutional owner. The sample period is from 1980 to 2010.
Date Mean Median S.D. Max.
1980/12 26.74 6 52.67 472
1981/12 26.5 6 52.39 497
1982/12 27.29 7 52.65 513
1983/12 27.36 8 52.85 551
1984/12 28.23 8 55.49 592
1985/12 32.23 10 60.91 634
1986/12 32.55 10 61.15 632
1987/12 34.28 11 66.02 687
1988/12 36.62 12 68.74 694
1989/12 39.17 13 73.27 689
1990/12 40.08 14 74.94 736
1991/12 42.29 15 76.2 716
1992/12 46.52 17 81.94 766
1993/12 41.61 16 72.04 728
1994/12 43.98 17 76.62 777
1995/12 49.2 19 85.27 881
1996/12 47.29 18 83.71 902
1997/12 52.86 20 92.1 985
1998/12 59.75 21 106.24 1,100
1999/12 72.62 32 117.76 1,133
2000/12 82.12 35 130.33 1,231
2001/12 86.22 45 126.12 1,156
2002/12 96.33 53 134.6 1,256
2003/12 113.41 74 144.32 1,347
2004/12 124.42 83 151.51 1,366
2005/12 125.27 80 157.9 1,409
2006/12 134.7 88 165.62 1,519
2007/12 138.67 87 176.1 1,608
2008/12 133.24 84 170.03 1,557
2009/12 147.55 97 182.86 1,618
2010/12 156.38 99 194.61 1,689
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Table 2: Summary statistics of individual stock alphas
Panel A. Six-factor model alpha with five-year rolling windows. Individual stock monthly returns
are fitted to the six-factor model with a five-year rolling window at the end of each month: Rp,t −Rf,t =
αp+βp(Rm,t−Rf,t) + spSMBt+hpHMLt+upUMDt+ lpLt+ bpBABt+ p,t; where Rm,t−Rf,t, SMBt,
and HMLt are the Fama and French (1993) three factors; UMDt is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor;
Lt is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor; and BABt is the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)
betting against beta factor. Alphas are estimated from December 1984 to December 2010. The summary
statistics of the number of negative alphas, positive alphas, significantly negative alphas (20%, two-tailed),
insignificant alphas, and significantly positive alphas (20%, two-tailed) are reported.
Negative Positive Negative at
10%
Insignificant Positive at
10%
Maximum 2,811 2,025 445 3,390 755
Minimum 1,594 1,023 62 2,318 247
Average 2,099 1,582 256 2,992 433
25 Percentile 1,745 1,418 180 2,728 366
75 Percentile 2,430 1,789 331 3,256 487
S.D. 357 241 94 285 99
Panel B. Six-factor model alpha with three-year rolling windows. Individual stock monthly
returns are fitted to the six-factor model with a three-year rolling window at the end of each month:
Rp,t − Rf,t = αp + βp(Rm,t − Rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + upUMDt + lpLt + bpBABt + p,t; where
Rm,t − Rf,t, SMBt, and HMLt are the Fama and French (1993) three factors; UMDt is the Carhart
(1997) momentum factor; Lt is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor; and BABt is the
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting against beta factor. Alphas are estimated from December 1982 to
December 2010. The summary statistics of the number of negative alphas, positive alphas, significantly
negative alphas (20%, two-tailed), insignificant alphas, and significantly positive alphas (20%, two-tailed)
are reported.
Negative Positive Negative at
10%
Insignificant Positive at
10%
Maximum 3,105 2,707 657 4,320 832
Minimum 1,747 1,433 138 2,839 258
Average 2,328 2,047 377 3,538 461
25 Percentile 1,993 1,825 281 3,222 376
75 Percentile 2,589 2,242 458 3,798 521
S.D. 374 327 119 392 112
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Table 3: Valuation ratios and portfolio alphas
Panel A. Top and bottom quintile portfolios. Each month, all stocks are sorted into five quintile
portfolios based on their valuation ratios at the end of the previous month. Stocks in the Quintile 5
portfolios have the highest valuation ratios. Two valuation ratios are used: P/S and P/E. I adjust
negative P/E by two methods. Firstly, I exclude negative P/E stocks from the sample. Secondly I sort
stocks by the negative earnings yield (E/P ). Portfolios are rebalanced monthly. Equally-weighted (EW)
and value-weighted (VW) monthly portfolio returns are calculated. Portfolios’ abnormal returns αp are
estimated by the six-factor model: Rp,t−Rf,t = αp+βp(Rm,t−Rf,t) + spSMBt+hpHMLt+upUMDt+
lpLt+bpBABt+ p,t; where Rm,t−Rf,t, SMBt, and HMLt are the Fama and French (1993) three factors;
UMDt is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor; Lt is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor;
and BABt is the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting against beta factor. Portfolio abnormal returns
αp are presented as percentages per month. The sample period is from January 1980 to December 2010.
p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively,
two-tailed.
P/S P/E
EW VW EW VW
All Observations
Quintile 5 -0.5*** -0.1** -0.5*** -0.3***
(0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000)
Quintile 1 1.0*** 0.2* -0.7*** -0.5***
(0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.001)
P/E (Positive Only)
Quintile 5 -0.5*** -0.3***
(0.000) (0.001)
Quintile 1 1.5*** 0.6***
(0.000) (0.000)
−E/P
Quintile 5 -0.2* -0.6***
(0.082) (0.001)
Quintile 1 1.2*** 0.4***
(0.000) (0.000)
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Panel B. Decile portfolios sorted by valuation ratios. Each month, all stocks are sorted into ten
decile portfolios based on their valuation ratios at the previous month end. Stocks in the Decile 10 portfolios
have the highest valuation ratios. Two valuation ratios are used: P/S, P/E. I adjust negative P/E by two
methods. Firstly, I exclude negative P/E stocks from the sample. Secondly I sort stocks by the negative
earnings yield (E/Y ). Portfolios are rebalanced monthly. Equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted
(VW) monthly portfolio returns are calculated. Portfolio abnormal returns αp are estimated by the six-
factor model: Rp,t−Rf,t = αp+βp(Rm,t−Rf,t)+spSMBt+hpHMLt+upUMDt+ lpLt+ bpBABt+ p,t;
where Rm,t − Rf,t, SMBt, and HMLt are the Fama and French (1993) three factors; UMDt is the
Carhart (1997) momentum factor; Lt is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor; and BABt is
the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting against beta factor. Portfolio abnormal returns αp are presented
as percentages per month. The sample period is from January 1980 to December 2010. p-values are
reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, two-tailed.
P/S P/E (Positive Only) −E/P
EW VW EW VW EW VW
Decile 1 1.4*** 0.4** 1.8*** 0.7*** 1.6*** 0.6***
(0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Decile 2 0.7*** 0.2* 1.1*** 0.6*** 0.8*** 0.4***
(0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Decile 3 0.4*** -0.0 0.7*** 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.2*
(0.000) (0.867) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.082)
Decile 4 0.3*** 0.0 0.4*** 0.2 -0.0 -0.0
(0.001) (0.592) (0.000) (0.131) (0.956) (0.993)
Decile 5 0.2** 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2** -0.1
(0.014) (0.743) (0.257) (0.255) (0.038) (0.265)
Decile 6 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.3*** -0.2**
(0.243) (0.934) (0.625) (0.601) (0.000) (0.014)
Decile 7 -0.1 0.0 -0.1* -0.1 -0.4*** -0.2
(0.380) (0.627) (0.073) (0.131) (0.000) (0.194)
Decile 8 -0.2** -0.0 -0.3*** -0.2** -0.7*** -0.6***
(0.030) (0.643) (0.001) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000)
Decile 9 -0.3*** -0.1 -0.5*** -0.4*** -0.5** -0.7***
(0.002) (0.252) (0.000) (0.001) (0.026) (0.000)
Decile 10 -0.7*** -0.2* -0.6*** -0.3** -0.01** -0.6**
(0.000) (0.082) (0.000) (0.032) (0.011) (0.027)
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Table 4: Misvaluation by dispersion of opinions and short sale constraints
Each month, stocks are sorted into five quintile portfolios based on the dispersion of opinions proxy at
the end of the previous month. Then each quintile portfolio is further divided into five groups based
on the proxy variable for short sale constraints at the end of the previous month. Following Boehmer
et al. (2006), the dispersion proxy is estimated by the vicile-based model in Panel A, and is estimated
by continuous-value model in Panel B. “Vicile” is used in Boehmer et al. (2006), and it means “twenty
times”. The word is based from Latin vicie. The equally-weighted (EW) and valued-weighted (VW)
monthly returns of portfolios with the highest dispersion of opinions and short sale constraints (Q5 &
Q5) and of portfolios with the lowest dispersion of opinions and short sale constraints (Q1 & Q1) are
calculated. Portfolio abnormal returns αp are estimated by the six-factor model: Rp,t − Rf,t = αp +
βp(Rm,t−Rf,t) + spSMBt +hpHMLt +upUMDt + lpLt + bpBABt + p,t; where Rm,t−Rf,t, SMBt, and
HMLt are the Fama and French (1993) three factors; UMDt is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor;
Lt is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor; and BABt is the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)
betting against beta factor. Portfolio abnormal returns αp are presented as percentages per month. Both
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regressions are used. The weights in
WLS are the number of stocks in portfolios each month. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗
denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, two-tailed.
Panel A. Six-factor model alpha with constraint and dispersion estimated by the vicile-based
model
EW VW
OLS WLS OLS WLS
Q5&Q5 -0.9** -0.7*** -1.3*** -1.1***
(0.031) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003)
Q1&Q1 0.1* 0.1* 0.1 0.1
(0.086) (0.088) (0.252) (0.287)
Panel B. Six-factor model alpha with constraint and dispersion estimated by continuous-
value model
EW VW
OLS WLS OLS WLS
Q5&Q5 -0.9** -0.6*** -1.5*** -1.1***
(0.051) (0.009) (0.004) (0.011)
Q1&Q1 0.1* 0.1* 0.1 0.1
(0.086) (0.088) (0.267) (0.312)
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Table 5: Institutional holdings of misvalued stocks: Preliminary summary statistics
Panel A. Mean institutional holdings of significantly positive alpha stocks and significantly
negative alpha stocks. At each quarter, all stocks are sorted into five quintile groups by their market
value. Then the cross-sectional average of institutional holdings (IO) of significantly positive alpha stocks
and significantly negative alpha stocks are both calculated. This panel reports the time-series mean of
cross-sectional average IO. Alphas are estimated by using the six-factor model with five-year rolling
windows and with three-year rolling windows: Rp,t−Rf,t = αp+βp(Rm,t−Rf,t) + spSMBt+hpHMLt+
upUMDt+lpLt+bpBABt+p,t; whereRm,t−Rf,t, SMBt, andHMLt are the Fama and French (1993) three
factors; UMDt is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor; Lt is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity
factor; and BABt is the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting against beta factor. The significance level
for alpha is 10% on both sides. The sample period is from January 1980 to December 2010. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗
denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Size Q1 Size Q2 Size Q3 Size Q4 Size Q5
6F5Y
Alpha (Pos.) 5.82% 17.21% 36.37% 54.92% 62.17%
Alpha (Neg.) 12.88% 30.27% 44.89% 52.29% 57.11%
Diff. *** *** *** ***
6F3Y
Alpha (Pos.) 5.50% 14.69% 31.02% 50.50% 60.33%
Alpha (Neg.) 10.06% 25.70% 39.63% 49.03% 56.06%
Diff. *** *** *** ***
Panel B. Mean institutional holding measures by quintile positive valuation ratios. Each quar-
ter, stocks are sorted into five quintile portfolios by: P/S, P/E (positive only), and − E/P , respectively.
Stocks in Q5 portfolios are more likely to be overvalued and stocks in Q1 portfolios are more likely to
be undervalued. The cross-sectional averages of stocks’ institutional holding measurements are calculated
for every portfolio at each quarterly end from March 1981 to December 2010. This panel reports the
time-series mean of the cross-sectional average of institutional holding measures.
Q5 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1
IO
P/S 29.48% 34.20% 35.31% 36.27% 28.14%
P/E (Positive Only) 37.55% 40.60% 39.37% 35.62% 32.28%
− E/P 18.20% 30.09% 39.89% 38.25% 33.23%
BHM
P/S 0.61% 0.58% 0.49% 0.38% 0.06%
P/E (Positive Only) 0.84% 0.85% 0.71% 0.55% 0.35%
− E/P 0.42% 0.52% 0.86% 0.66% 0.41%
SHM
P/S 0.63% 0.73% 0.59% 0.47% 0.40%
P/E(Positive Only) 0.58% 0.86% 0.79% 0.57% 0.43%
− E/P 0.35% 0.34% 0.79% 0.73% 0.46%
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Panel C. Mean institutional ownership of overvalued (undervalued) stocks with highest (low-
est) dispersion of opinions and highest (lowest) short sale constraints. At each quarter, the
cross-sectional average of institutional ownership of stocks with top (bottom) decile dispersion of opinions
and top (bottom) decile short sale constraints is calculated. The time-series mean of the cross-sectional
average is reported.
Dispersion of Opinions Decile 10 &
Short Sale Constraints Decile 10
Dispersion of Opinions Decile 1 &
Short Sale Constraints Decile 1
IO 26.91% 24.38%
Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of institutional holdings and stock alphas
Panel A. Institutional ownership IO and individual stock six-factor–five-year-rolling alphas.
This panel presents the results of the cross-sectional regressions of the quarterly institutional holdings of
individual stocks on stock rolling alphas and other stock characteristics. The dependent variable is the in-
stitutional ownership as a percentage of the firm’s market capitalization (IO). Independent variable alphai
is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (–1) if alphai estimated by the six-factor model with five-year
rolling windows is positive (negative) at 10%, on both sides. Other independent variables follow Gom-
pers and Metrick (2001): Size, B/M , DividendY ield, Price, V olatility, Momentum1, Momentum2,
Turnover, and S&P 500 Dummy. Detailed definitions of the independent variables are described in Ap-
pendix A.2.3. The sample period is from December 1984 to December 2010. White (1980) standard errors
are used in the quarterly cross-sectional regressions. The table reports the average regression coefficients
on 105 separate quarterly OLS regressions. The table also reports the number of positive coefficients, the
number of significantly positive coefficients at the 5% level, the number of negative coefficients, and the
number of significantly negative coefficients at the 5% level.
Variable Average Coefficient Pos. Pos./Sig* Neg. Neg./Sig*
Significant Alpha Dummy -0.030 19 8 86 61
Size 0.049 105 105 0 0
B/M -0.002 30 6 75 44
Yield -0.016 2 0 103 66
Price 0.054 105 88 0 0
Volatility -0.016 20 0 85 33
Momentum1 -0.043 15 0 90 36
Momentum2 -0.041 6 0 99 60
Turnover 0.070 105 105 0 0
S&P500 Dummy -0.064 27 17 78 60
Constant -0.483 6 0 99 83
Avg. R-squared = 0.5959
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Panel B. Institutional buy-herding measure and individual stock six-factor–five-year-rolling
alphas. This panel presents the results of the cross-sectional regressions of the quarterly institutional
buy-herding measure BHM on stock rolling alphas and other stock characteristics. The rest of the test is
the same as Panel A.
Variable Average Coefficient Pos. Pos./Sig* Neg. Neg./Sig*
Significant Alpha Dummy -0.0008 47 6 58 7
Size 0.0207 105 103 0 0
B/M -0.0003 34 6 71 17
Yield -0.0004 44 3 61 8
Price -0.0052 21 1 84 17
Volatility -0.0016 42 2 63 7
Momentum1 -0.0050 44 0 61 7
Momentum2 -0.0038 30 4 75 18
Turnover 0.0063 95 44 10 0
S&P500 Dummy 0.0120 63 26 36 4
Constant -0.3414 0 0 105 101
Avg. R-squared = 0.3176
Panel C. Institutional sell-herding measure and individual stock six-factor–five-year-rolling
alphas. This panel presents the results of the cross-sectional regressions of the quarterly institutional
sell-herding measure SHM on stock rolling alphas and other stock characteristics. The rest of the test is
the same as Panel A.
Variable Average Coefficient Pos. Pos./Sig* Neg. Neg./Sig*
Significant Alpha Dummy 0.003 66 7 39 2
Size 0.006 90 36 15 0
B/M 0.000 59 10 46 10
Yield -0.001 37 0 68 17
Price -0.009 21 0 84 18
Volatility -0.001 49 0 56 2
Momentum1 0.004 51 4 54 5
Momentum2 0.006 64 6 41 2
Turnover 0.003 73 19 32 0
S&P500 Dummy 0.005 61 18 44 10
Constant -0.081 21 1 84 25
Avg. R-squared = 0.0664
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Table 7: Pooled regressions with double clustered standard errors by firm and quarter
Panel A. Institutional ownership IO and individual stock six-factor–five-year-rolling alphas.
This panel presents the pooled regression results of IOi = Ci+βαalphai+βiXi+i. I cluster the standard
errors by both firm and quarter. The dependent variable is IOi, the percentage of institutional ownership
of stock i. Alpha is estimated by the six-factor model with five-year rolling windows on stock monthly
returns. Significant Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive
(negative) at 10%. Significant Alpha is the actual value of significant alphai. Significant Alpha Lag
is the actual value of significant alphai in the previous quarter. Alpha is the actual value of alphai.
Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive (negative). Other
independent variables follow Gompers and Metrick (2001): Size, B/M , DividendY ield, Price, V olatility,
Momentum1, Momentum2, Turnover, and S&P 500 Dummy. Detailed definitions of the independent
variables are described in Appendix A.2.3. The sample period is from December 1984 to December 2010.
p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively,
two-tailed.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Significant Alpha Dummy -0.031***
(0.000)
Significant Alpha -0.790***
(0.000)
Significant Alpha Lag -0.802***
(0.000)
Alpha -1.016***
(0.000)
Alpha Dummy -0.017***
(0.000)
Size 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.066***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B/M -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*
(0.176) (0.195) (0.232) (0.071) (0.065)
Yield -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Price 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.033***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.002 -0.006*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.532) (0.093)
Momentum1 -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.057*** -0.041*** -0.044***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Momentum2 -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.037***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.069*** 0.069***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
S&P500 Dummy -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.081*** -0.079***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.699*** -0.664*** -0.655*** -0.710*** -0.719***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 66,603 66,603 64,635 357,109 357,109
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
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Panel B. Institutional buy-herding measure and individual stock six-factor–five-year-rolling
alphas. This panel presents the pooled regression results of IOi = Ci+βαalphai+βiXi+ i. I cluster the
standard errors by both firm and quarter. The dependent variable is the institutional buy-herding measure
BHM (Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 1999). Alpha is estimated by the six-factor model with five-year
rolling windows on stock monthly returns. Significant Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable which is
equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive (negative) at 10%. Significant Alpha is the actual value of significant
alphai. Significant Alpha Lag is the actual value of significant alphai in the previous quarter. Alpha is
the actual value of alphai. Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive
(negative). Other independent variables follow Gompers and Metrick (2001): Size, B/M , DividendY ield,
Price, V olatility, Momentum1, Momentum2, Turnover, and S&P 500 Dummy. Detailed definitions of
the independent variables are described in Appendix A.2.3. The sample period is from December 1984 to
December 2010. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively, two-tailed.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Significant Alpha Dummy -0.001*
(0.092)
Significant Alpha -0.069***
(0.000)
Significant Alpha Lag -0.064***
(0.001)
Alpha -0.043***
(0.006)
Alpha Dummy -0.000*
(0.073)
Size 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B/M -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.051) (0.048)
Yield -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000**
(0.219) (0.180) (0.143) (0.017) (0.016)
Price 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.808) (0.133) (0.170) (0.258) (0.398)
Volatility -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.789) (0.484) (0.544) (0.197) (0.106)
Momentum1 -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.092) (0.171) (0.167) (0.125) (0.105)
Momentum2 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001*
(0.069) (0.189) (0.230) (0.074) (0.051)
Turnover 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
S&P500 Dummy 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.215*** -0.208*** -0.208***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 24,439 24,439 23,647 128,444 128,444
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18
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Panel C. Institutional sell-herding measure and individual stock six-factor–five-year-rolling
alphas. This panel presents the pooled regression results of IOi = Ci+βαalphai+βiXi+ i. I cluster the
standard errors by both firm and quarter. The dependent variable is the institutional sell-herding measure
SHM (Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 1999). Alpha is estimated by the six-factor model with five-year
rolling windows on stock monthly returns. Significant Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable which is
equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive (negative) at 10%. Significant Alpha is the actual value of significant
alphai. Significant Alpha Lag is the actual value of significant alphai in the previous quarter. Alpha is
the actual value of alphai. Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive
(negative). Other independent variables follow Gompers and Metrick (2001): Size, B/M , DividendY ield,
Price, V olatility, Momentum1, Momentum2, Turnover, and S&P 500 Dummy. Detailed definitions of
the independent variables are described in Appendix A.2.3. The sample period is from December 1984 to
December 2010. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively, two-tailed.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Significant Alpha Dummy 0.003***
(0.002)
Significant Alpha 0.015
(0.595)
Significant Alpha Lag 0.031
(0.287)
Alpha 0.036*
(0.092)
Alpha Dummy 0.001***
(0.001)
Size 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B/M 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.255) (0.251) (0.253) (0.209) (0.202)
Yield -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.918) (0.819)
Price -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.275) (0.169) (0.198) (0.409) (0.376)
Momentum1 0.008** 0.008** 0.009** 0.006* 0.006*
(0.046) (0.034) (0.024) (0.067) (0.066)
Momentum2 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.002 0.002
(0.043) (0.026) (0.034) (0.215) (0.217)
Turnover 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.941) (0.947) (0.958) (0.182) (0.170)
S&P500 Dummy 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.052*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.058***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 36,462 36,462 35,565 190,631 190,631
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
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Table 8: Cross-sectional analysis of institutional holdings and stock alphas by institution
type
This table presents the results of the pooled regressions of quarterly institutional ownership on individ-
ual stock rolling alphas, controlling for other stock characteristics: Size, B/M , DividendY ield, Price,
V olatility, Momentum1, Momentum2, Turnover, and S&P 500 (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Detailed
definitions of the control variables are described in Appendix A.2.3. The standard errors are clustered by
both firm and quarter. Following Kamara et al. (2008), I divide institutional investors into three groups:
banks and insurance companies, investment companies and independent investment advisors, and others.
Only the coefficients for alpha are reported. Alphas are estimated by the six-factor model with five-year
rolling windows on stock monthly returns. The sample period is from December 1984 to December 1997.
p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively,
two-tailed.
Bank and In-
surance
Investment
Company and
Independent
Investment
Advisor
All Others
Significant Alpha Dummy -0.002 -0.007* -0.002**
(0.267) (0.098) (0.023)
Significant Alpha -0.261*** -0.607*** -0.067***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Significant Alpha Lag -0.278*** -0.649*** -0.070***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Alpha -0.183*** -0.427*** -0.056***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Alpha Dummy -0.001** -0.005*** -0.001***
(0.044) (0.000) (0.001)
Table 9: Time-series analysis of institutional holdings and the degree of stock overvaluation
Panel A. Dickey–Fuller unit root test. This Panel shows the unit root and the time trend tests for
IOt and alphat: Yt − Yt−1 = C + (λ − 1)Yt−1 + βT + i. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗
denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, two-tailed.
Delta IO Delta Alpha
(1) (2)
IO Lag -0.336***
(0.000)
Alpha Lag -0.062*
(0.072)
T 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.204)
Constant 0.112*** 0.000
(0.000) -0.57
Observations 108 100
Rsquared 0.16 0.12
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Panel B. Detrended IO and the degree of overvaluation: valuation ratios. The quarterly
institutional percentage holdings of the overvalued portfolio IOt are regressed on the six-factor model
alphat of the overvalued portfolio. The overvalued portfolio is composed of the top quintile P/S or
positive P/E stocks. The sample period for the regression is from December 1984 to December 2010.
p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively,
two-tailed.
Detrended IO Detrended IO
(1) (2)
Alpha of Top Quintile P/S Portfolio -6.59**
(0.032)
Alpha of Top Quintile Positive P/E Portfolio -13.15***
(0.000)
Constant 0.472 0.461
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 101 101
Rsquared 0.06 0.09
Panel C. Detrended IO and the degree of overvaluation: significant alpha. The quarterly
institutional percentage holdings of the overvalued portfolio and undervalued portfolio IOt are regressed
on the six-factor model alphat. The overvalued portfolio is composed of the significantly negative alpha
stocks and the undervalued portfolio is composed of the significantly positive alpha stocks. The sample
period is from December 1984 to December 2010. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, two-tailed.
Detrend IO Overvalued Detrend IO Undervalued
(1) (2)
Alpha Overvalued -8.759
(0.000)
Alpha Undervalued 1.356
(0.362)
Constant 0.295 0.474
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 105 105
Rsquared 0.1 0.01
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Table 10: Hansen–Hodrick standard errors for overlapping alpha estimation
This table presents the regression results of IOi = Ci + βαalphai + βiXi + i. The Hansen and Hodrick
(1980) standard error estimator is applied to mitigate the overlapping alpha estimation concern. The
dependent variable is IOi, the percentage of institutional ownership of stock i. Alpha is estimated by the
six-factor model with five-year rolling windows on stock monthly returns. Significant Alpha Dummy is
a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive (negative) at 10%. Significant Alpha is
the actual value of significant alphai. Significant Alpha Lag is the actual value of significant alphai in
the previous quarter. Alpha is the actual value of alphai. Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable which is
equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive (negative). Other independent variables follow Gompers and Metrick
(2001): Size, B/M , DividendY ield, Price, V olatility, Momentum1, Momentum2, Turnover, and S&P
500 Dummy. Detailed definitions of the independent variables are described in Appendix A.2.3. The
sample period is from December 1984 to December 2010. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗
denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, two-tailed.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Significant Alpha Dummy -0.031***
(0.000)
Significant Alpha -0.790***
(0.000)
Significant Alpha Lag -0.802***
(0.000)
Alpha -1.016***
(0.000)
Alpha dummy -0.017***
(0.000)
Size 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.066***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B/M -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.336) (0.377) (0.448) (0.000) (0.000)
Yield -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Price 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.033***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.002* -0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.070) (0.000)
Momentum1 -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.057*** -0.041*** -0.044***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Momentum2 -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.037***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.069*** 0.069***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
S&P500 Dummy -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.081*** -0.079***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.699*** -0.664*** -0.655*** -0.710*** -0.719***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 66603 66603 64635 357109 357109
Centred R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
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Table 11: Average institutional ownership and stock alphas
This table presents the pooled regression results of IOi = Ci+βαalphai+βiXi+ i. I cluster the standard
errors by both firm and quarter. The dependent variable is IOAverage, the average of five-year quarterly
institutional ownership of stock i over the past five years. Alpha is estimated by the six-factor model with
five-year rolling windows on stock monthly returns. Significant Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable
which is equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive (negative) at 10%. Significant Alpha is the actual value
of significant alphai. Significant Alpha Lag is the actual value of significant alphai in the previous
quarter. Alpha is the actual value of alphai. Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (−1)
if alphai is positive (negative). Other independent variables follow Gompers and Metrick (2001): Size,
B/M , DividendY ield, Price, V olatility, Momentum1, Momentum2, Turnover, and S&P 500 Dummy.
Detailed definitions of the independent variables are described in Appendix A.2.3. The sample period is
from December 1984 to December 2010. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, two-tailed.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Significant Alpha Dummy -0.053***
(0.000)
Significant Alpha -1.700***
(0.000)
Significant Alpha Lag -1.742***
(0.000)
Alpha -2.034***
(0.000)
Alpha dummy -0.028***
(0.000)
Size 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B/M -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.186) (0.299) (0.530) (0.145) (0.127)
Yield -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Price 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.033*** 0.030***
(0.037) (0.027) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility -0.022*** -0.012** -0.012** 0.007 -0.000
(0.000) (0.022) (0.018) (0.138) (0.977)
Momentum1 -0.049*** -0.040*** -0.061*** -0.030** -0.037***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.016) (0.004)
Momentum2 -0.040*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.046***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.073*** 0.073***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
S&P500 Dummy -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.043*** -0.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.593*** -0.503*** -0.505*** -0.441*** -0.471***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 37,553 37,553 37,525 206,428 206,428
R-squared 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56
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Table 12: High inflow versus low inflow quarters
This table summarizes the results of the Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions and the pooled regressions
of institutional ownership IO on stock misvaluation measures: IOi = Ci + βαalphai + βiXi + i. The
dependent variable is IOi, the percentage of institutional ownership of stock i. Alpha is estimated by the
six-factor model with five-year rolling windows on stock monthly returns. Significant Alpha Dummy is
a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive (negative) at 10%. Significant Alpha is
the actual value of significant alphai. Significant Alpha Lag is the actual value of significant alphai in
the previous quarter. Alpha is the actual value of alphai. Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable which is
equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive (negative). Other independent variables follow Gompers and Metrick
(2001): Size, B/M , DividendY ield, Price, V olatility, Momentum1, Momentum2, Turnover, and S&P
500 Dummy. Detailed definitions of the independent variables are described in Appendix A.2.3. I separate
all quarters into two groups by the normalized institution fund inflows. The sample period is from 1980
to 2010. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively, two-tailed.
Fama–Macbeth Regression Pooled Regression
High Inflow Low Inflow High Inflow Low Inflow
Significant Alpha Dummy -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032***
(0.427) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Significant Alpha -0.801*** -0.932*** -0.797*** -0.780***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Significant Alpha Lag -0.827*** -0.915*** -0.811*** -0.790***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Alpha -0.984*** -1.112*** -1.012*** -1.019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Alpha dummy -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Quarters 67 66 67 66
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Table 13: Subperiod analysis
This table summarizes the results of the Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions and the pooled regressions
of institutional ownership IO on stock misvaluation measures: IOi = Ci + βαalphai + βiXi + i. The
dependent variable is IOi, the percentage of institutional ownership of stock i. Alpha is estimated by the
six-factor model with five-year rolling windows on stock monthly returns. Significant Alpha Dummy is
a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive (negative) at 10%. Significant Alpha is
the actual value of significant alphai. Significant Alpha Lag is the actual value of significant alphai in
the previous quarter. Alpha is the actual value of alphai. Alpha Dummy is a dummy variable which is
equal to 1 (−1) if alphai is positive (negative). Other independent variables follow Gompers and Metrick
(2001): Size, B/M , DividendY ield, Price, V olatility, Momentum1, Momentum2, Turnover, and S&P
500 Dummy. Detailed definitions of the independent variables are described in Appendix A.2.3. I separate
my sample into two subperiods: 1980–1994 and 1995–2010. The sample period is from 1980 to 2010.
p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively,
two-tailed.
Fama–Macbeth Regression Pooled Regression
1980–1994 1995–2010 1980–1994 1995–2010
Significant Alpha Dummy -0.009*** -0.047*** -0.008** -0.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
Significant Alpha -0.460*** -1.128*** -0.412*** -0.885***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Significant Alpha Lag -0.480*** -1.117*** -0.430*** -0.889***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Alpha -0.505*** -1.398*** -0.442*** -1.187***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Alpha Dummy -0.005*** -0.024*** -0.004** -0.022***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000)
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Table 16: Are institutional investors rational trend chasers?
Panel A. Raw returns of portfolios sorted by unexpected institutional ownership and stock
alpha. This panel shows the raw returns of portfolios sorted by unexpected institutional ownership and
stock alpha. Following Field and Lowry (2009), I estimate the quarterly conditional mean of institutional
ownership percentage as a logistic function:
E(IOi,t | x) = exp{β1 + β2 ∗ Sizei,t}
1 + exp{β1 + β2 ∗ Sizei,t}
I calculate unexpected institutional ownership by IOi,t − E(IOi,t | x). At the beginning of each quarter,
I assign a stock in the portfolio if its last quarter unexpected institutional ownership is within the top
quintile and its last quarter stock alpha dummy is −1. I report the summary statistics for the portfolio
quarterly returns and the number of stocks in the portfolio.
Alpha Dummy & Q5 Unexpected Institutional Ownership
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Portfolio Raw Returns 105 0.042 0.114 -0.313 0.400
Number of Firms in the Portfolio 105 265 60 118 407
Significant Alpha Dummy & Q5 Unexpected Institutional Ownership
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Portfolio Raw Returns 105 0.051 0.145 -0.428 0.544
Number of Firms in the Portfolio 105 35 21 4 110
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Panel B. Fama–French three-factor model alpha of portfolios sorted by unexpected insti-
tutional ownership and stock alpha. This panel shows the results of WLS regressions of quarterly
returns on the Fama–French three factors. Weights are equal to the number of stocks in the portfolio. The
stocks in the portfolio have top quintile unexpected institutional ownership and negative alpha dummy
in the previous quarter. The t-statistics is in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote significance levels of 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively, two-tailed.
Alpha Dummy & Q5 Unex-
pected Institutional Owner-
ship
Significant Alpha Dummy &
Q5 Unexpected Institutional
Ownership
Intercept 0.014*** 0.016*
(0.000) (0.92)
RmRf 1.032*** 1.051***
(0.000) (0.000)
SMB 0.642*** 1.544***
(0.000) (0.000)
HML 0.596*** 0.719***
(0.000) (0.000)
Obs 105 105
Adj. R-squared 0.940 0.836
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